On Friday, February 14, 2014, there was a release of radioactive material in the underground repository at the Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Following initial visual inspections of the mine and evidence of fire damage was discovered, the Accident Investigation Board established a Fire Forensic Analysis Team.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Accident Prevention Investigation Board was appointed to investigate a fire at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant that occurred on February 5, 2014. An aged EIMCO 985-T15 salt haul truck (dump truck) caught fire in an underground mine.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Accident Investigation Board investigated an accident at Sandia National Laboratories, Site 9920 on December 11, 2013. Site 9920 personnel were testing an integrated explosive device, containing a fireset and detonator when the IED unexpectedly went off during handling, causing injury to the firing officer’s left hand.
On June 28, 2013, an Accident Investigation Board was appointed to investigate an accident at the Department of Energy Germantown Headquarters facility, on June 1, 2013 that resulted in a fatality on June 24, 2013.
This report is an independent product of the Level I Accident Investigation Board appointed by Brad Bea, Chief Safety Officer, Bonneville Power Administration. The Board was appointed to perform a Level I Accident Investigation and to prepare an investigation report in accordance with Bonneville Power Administration Manual, Chapter 181, Accident Investigation and Reporting.
On February 15, 2013, an Accident Investigation Board (the Board) was appointed to investigate an accident that resulted in serious injuries caused when a scissor lift tipped over in Brine Tank-14 (WHT-14) at the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, West Hackberry, Louisiana, site on February 7, 2013. The Board’s responsibilities have been completed with respect to this investigation. The analysis and the identification of the direct cause, root causes, contributing causes, and judgments of need resulting from this investigation were performed in accordance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 225.1B, Accident Investigations.
This report is an independent product of the Level l Accident Investigation Board appointed by Brad Bea, Chief Safety Officer, Bonneville Power Administration. The Board was appointed to perform a Levell Accident Investigation and to prepare an investigation report in accordance with Bonneville Power Administration Manual, Chapter 181, Accident Investigation and Reporting
On August 25, 2012, radioactive contamination was identified on Flight Path 04 of the Lujan Center, an experimental area that is part of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Los Alamos National Laboratory is operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC. The Operating Contractor quickly determined that the contamination had spread offsite, and response teams were immediately brought in.
This report documents the Naval Reactors investigation into the collapse ofa partially-erected spent fuel storage building, Overpack Storage Expansion #2 (OSE2), at the Naval Reactors Facility. The Accident Investigation Board inspected the scene, collected physical and photographic evidence, interviewed involved personnel, and reviewed relevant documents to determine the key causes of the accident. Based on the information gathered during the investigation, the Board identified several
engineering and safety deficiencies that need to be addressed to prevent recurrence.
On June 29, 2012, at approximately 2:35 p.m., a Brookhaven Sciences Associates maintenance metals worker was climbing a fixed ladder located on the exterior of Brookhaven National Laboratory Building 830. The worker lost three-points of contact with the fixed ladder and fell from a height of approximately 15-feet landing on asphalt pavement.
On November 8, 2011, workers at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) Facility were packaging plutonium (Pu) reactor fuel plates. Two of the fuel storage containers had atypical labels indicating potential abnormalities with the fuel plates located inside. Upon opening one of the storage containers,
the workers discovered a Pu fuel plate wrapped in plastic and tape. When the workers attempted to remove the wrapping material, an uncontrolled release of radioactive contaminants occurred, resulting in the contamination of 16 workers and the facility
On September 13, 2011, a recently-hired, untrained subcontractor employee struck three large elevated pipes while operating a front deck mower at the Cavern 5 area of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Bryan Mound (SPR-BM) site.
On July 1, 2011, a worker fell from portable scaffolding during facility modifications in the Purification Area Vault (PAV) of Building 105-K at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The worker required hospitalization due to sustained head injury and numerous broken ribs. This accident meets Accident Investigation Criteria 2.a.2 of Appendix A of DOE Order 225.1B, Accident Investigations (i.e. hospitalization of the injured worker for more than five calendar days, commencing within seven calendar days of the accident).
In consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy (FE), the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer appointed an Independent Review Board (IRE3) on July 20,201 0, under the provisions of the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 225.1 A, Accident Investigations, that represented a modified Type A accident investigation.
On Saturday, March 5, 2011 at approximately 10:20 a.m., a Brookhaven National Laboratory Building and Grounds Utility Worker was felling a pine tree while elevated in a 60-foot articulating and telescoping boom lift approximately 20-feet above the ground on the south side of Building 488. As the gas-powered, 20-inch chainsaw being used by the employee cut through the tree trunk, an approximately 8-foot long, 18-inch diameter, 520 pound section of tree trunk fell toward the aerial lift, striking the employee’s right forearm, and compressing it against the top railing of the aerial lift basket.
On March 2, 2010 at the request of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) Chief Safety Officer, a Level I Accident Investigation was convened to investigate an accident in which a supplemental labor contractor was fatally injured in a Bobcat/backhoe accident at the White Bluffs Substation near Richland, Washington on March 1, 2010.
This report is an independent product of the Type A Accident Investigation Board appointed by Thomas P. D’Agostino, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy and Glenn S. Podonsky, Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer, Office of Health, Safety and Security.
This report is an independent product of the Type A Accident Investigation Board (Board) appointed by Anthony H. Montoya, Chief Operating Officer, Office of the Chief Operating Officer, Western Area Power Administration.
On October 11, 2004, at approximately 11:15 am, a subcontractor electrician working at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) received serious burn injuries requiring hospitalization due to an electrical arc flash that occurred during the installation of a circuit breaker in an energized 480-Volt (V) electrical panel.
On August 17, 2004, at approximately 0940, a Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) pilot was killed in the crash of a Bell 206BIII helicopter while stringing "sock line" to enable the subsequent stringing of new conductors and static wire on the Grand Coulee-Bell #6 500-kV line between tower 84/2 and BPA’s Bell Substation in Mead, Washington. (See Appendix 7, Site Map.)
On July 26, 2004, at approximately 3:15 p.m., a truck driver (driver) was critically injured at the Savannah River Site, while loading a rented excavator onto a lowboy trailer for return to the rental company.
On June 21, 2001, at approximately 9:40 A.M., a construction sub-tier contractor employee (the “Operator”) at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) received serious head injuries requiring hospitalization when he was struck by part of the drilling rig (a “tong”) that he was operating.
On March 16, 2000, at approximately 2 p.m., a radiological release of plutonium-238 occurred near a glovebox in the Plutonium Processing and Handling Facility (TA-55) of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. At least seven of the eight workers who were in the room at the time received confirmed intakes of plutonium-238.