

**Transportation External Coordination Working Group
Security Topic Group Meeting
Summary
September 22, 2005**

Alex Thrower introduced himself as the new lead for the Security Topic Group (STG) and asked for introductions by the STG. (A sign-up sheet was provided.) In addition to stating their names and affiliations, STG members expressed their interest in expectations for the meeting and subsequent accomplishments from the group.

The STG Proposed Work Plan was placed up on the overhead during discussions for reference. Alex suggested members raise security topics of interest for consideration. One participant requested information about the status of the Transportation System Classification Guide and on the topic of vulnerability assessments. John Fitzgibbons, from the Office of Security, gave an informal verbal briefing of the Department's process for conducting vulnerability reviews and processes conducted by the Department for its myriad sites and systems. John informed the STG how the Office of Security (SO), since renamed the Office of Safety and Security Performance Assessment (SSA), will be developing transportation assessments following various on-going intelligence reviews.

John answered questions and explained that the NRC Design Basis Threat (DBT) for power plants does not equate to the potential adversaries' capability for the Transportation System. He explained that the Department's design metric formulates for a specific asset the consequences associated expressly with that asset. For a fixed facility, the DBT would vary based on whether assets requiring protection are Category 1 materials or whether the facilities contain chemical, biological or other materials. The analysis is not "one-for-one" with the intelligence threat assessment.

John noted that in addition to the DBT, the Department employs a number of requirements outlined in various DOE Orders and that there are Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) with local law enforcement to augment defense capabilities. Mr. Fitzgibbons differentiated the DBT development process from responsibilities of the Office of Intelligence for threat assessments.

One of the participants raised a question about interactions between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department, especially related to the National Critical Infrastructure Study. Mr. Marshall Combs, Director of the Office of Security, responded. As a member of the DHS Infrastructure Committee, Mr. Combs said the Department is interacting on an on-going basis with interagency partners to resolve stakeholder issues relative to security. He reported some of the issues on information dissemination relate to assurances that authorized persons at the State and local levels obtain appropriate security-related information necessary for emergency response. A question about jurisdiction in the case of a stopped transporter was posed. Mr. Combs responded to that question and stated that information flow-down and follow-through is better coordinated with State and local authorities now than at any time in his 32 years in the federal government.

David Crawford, Office of Security, presented information on a joint DOE/ NRC initiative to unify reporting requirements for national-level tracking of nuclear materials. Currently the different agencies have different nuclear material information requirements. Unifying reporting requirements will simplify and improve the accuracy of information exchanges as responsibility for SNF and other materials are transferred across DOE and NRC regulatory regimes.

An update of the Classification Guide was presented. Ms. Deborah Dawson and Mr. Christian Einberg summarized the activities of the Interagency Committee on the Classification Guide for Spent Nuclear Fuel. They presented the projected schedule and engaged in a discussion about the benefits of the Classification Guide to the handling of information. At the conclusion of this discussion, it was agreed that upon completion of the formal Classification Guide, an information-sharing protocol should be developed to aid the STG in understanding what information may be available to which State, local, and Tribal organizations and under what circumstances. STG members also concurred that interim guidance might benefit the program until the Classification Guide and protocol were approved by the interagency committee.

In pursuing the topic of information sharing, one law enforcement participant related how specific pieces of information could be shared and suggested that the Office of National Transportation (ONT) employ NRC safeguards program regulations for DOE shipments. Accordingly, it was expressed that only information pertaining to casks would be considered NRC Safeguards Information; other information could also follow NRC standards. Another STG member suggested the benefit of the DHS Joint Task Force on regional and information system sharing and that ONT rely on activities from that Task Force in framing its path forward. Another participant noted there seemed to be a significant gap between what DOE believes States want in terms of advance information, and what States really do want. States are primarily interested in having enough information, at a level that should not affect security, to perform their functions.

A railroad representative on the STG noted that the American Association of Railroads (AAR) security plan is threat driven and that it would be essential for the AAR to have threat information in order for its carrier members to take part in nuclear waste shipments.

Other discussions involved the applicability of 10 CFR 73 and Quality Assurance requirements to the Transportation System.

Alex proposed that that the STG review the Proposed Work Plan together. An in-depth discussion then took place on various facets of the Work Plan. Changes proposed during the STG meeting are reflected in the topic group's revised work plan.

The group adjourned at approximately 4:30 p.m.