



# Improving Safety Culture at DOE Sites

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HSS Workshop  
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# BACKGROUND



## WHAT IS SAFETY CULTURE?

- Safety Culture: *An organization's values and behaviors modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members, which serve to make safe performance of work the overriding priority to protect workers, the public, and the environment.*

## KEY REGULATORY DRIVERS:

- DOE Policy 420.1, *Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy*
- DOE Order 450.2, *Integrated Safety Management*
- DOE Guide 450.4-1C, *Integrated Safety Management System Guide*



# DOE/EFCOG Joint Safety Culture Task



- Evaluated Lessons Learned from Similar Safety Culture Improvement Initiatives (INPO, NRC, NASA, OSHA, and IAEA)
- Identified 3 Safety Culture Focus Areas and Associated Attributes:
  - Leadership
  - Employee/Worker Engagement
  - Organizational Learning
- Final Report Issued June 2010



# DNFSB Recommendation 2011-1



- DNFSB Response to Health and Safety Concerns Raised at WTP
- DNFSB Findings:
  - A Chilled Atmosphere Adverse to Safety Exist
  - DOE and Contractor Management Suppress Technical Dissent
- Recommendations:
  - Assert Federal Control at the Highest Level to Establish a Strong Safety Culture Within the WTP Project
  - Conduct an Extent of Condition Review to Estimate if Weaknesses Are Limited to the WTP Project
  - Conduct a Review of the Removal of Dr. Tamosaitis and How that is Affecting the Safety Culture at WTP



# HSS Independent Safety Culture Reviews



- DOE Response to Health and Safety Concerns Raised at WTP
- October 2010: *Independent Review of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Hanford Site WTP Project*
  - Key Findings:
    - Framework Exists for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture
    - Some Employees are Reluctant to Raise Safety Issues
    - Inconsistent Implementation of Safety Concerns Processes
- January 2012: *Independent Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture and Management of Nuclear Safety Concerns at the Hanford WTP*
  - Key Findings:
    - Most Personnel Believe Safety is a High Priority
    - Reluctance/Hesitation to Raise Concerns from Some Staff
    - Inconsistent Supervisor Behaviors
    - Loss of Employee Trust



# Implementation Plan for DNFSB Recommendation 2011-1



- Underlying Causes Hindering Implementation of A Robust Safety Culture:
  - Departmental Expectations Were Not Developed
  - A Need For Balanced Priorities
  - Insufficient Knowledge and Awareness of Safety Culture



# Extent of Condition Review



## Self-Assessments

- To Be Conducted At:
  - 7 NNSA Sites
  - 5 EM Sites
  - PNNL (SC)
  - NA HQ, EM HQ, SC HQ, and OECCM HQ
- Scheduled Completion:
  - March 2013



# Extent of Condition Review



## HSS Independent Review

- HSS Will Independently Review:
  - 5 Nuclear Facility Construction Projects
- Scheduled Completion:
  - Current HSS Scheduled Closeout October 2012



# Extent of Condition Review



## HSS Report Development

- A Consolidated Report Based on the Self Assessments and the HSS Independent Reviews Will Be Developed
- Scheduled Completion:
  - May 2013



# Moving Forward



- Safety Culture Improvement is an On-Going Process
- Periodic Revitalization is Necessary to Account for New Industry Information and Lessons Learned
- There is a Need To Improve Communication Between Workers, Their Representatives, and Functional Managers/Leads
- Improved Safety Culture Requires DOE Leadership