



## Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

July 17, 2012

### MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: JAMES B. O'BRIEN  
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY  
OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY

SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program  
Performance Indicators Quarterly Report,  
January – March 2012

This memorandum summarizes the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from January through March 2012. Data for these indicators were gathered by field elements per Department of Energy (DOE) Technical Standard 1063-2011, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program. Highlights from this report include:

#### **FR Staffing/Qualification/Oversight Data**

- DOE was staffed at 181 FR Full Time Equivalents (FTE), which is 95 percent of the full staffing level (DOE goal is 100 percent). Six FRs left due to transfer, promotion, or retirement. Four new FRs were hired from within their site organizations.
- DOE has 82 percent of the FR staff fully-qualified (DOE goal is > 80 percent).
- DOE FRs spent 78 percent of their time on oversight activities (DOE goal is > 65 percent).

#### **FR Program Highlights**

Individual site program highlights are included in the current FR Quarterly Report. The current and past FR Quarterly Reports, including the current FR information and current and past quarterly performance indicator reports, are available at the FR Web site at <http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/nfsp/facrep>.

If you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me at (301) 903-1408, or the DOE FR Program Manager, Earl Hughes, at (202) 586-0065.



# Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

## OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (EM)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Analysis FTE</u>	<u>Approved FTE</u>	<u>Actual Staff</u>	<u>% Staff *</u>	<u>Gains / Losses</u>	<u>% Core Qualified *</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
CBFO	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	71
ID (EM) <sup>1</sup>	7	7	8	100	0	100	100	91
OR (EM) <sup>2</sup>	16	16	15	94	-1	88	88	78
ORP <sup>3</sup>	14	14	13	93	-2, +1	78	78	80
PPPO <sup>4</sup>	6	6	6	100	0	83	83	71
RL <sup>5</sup>	17	17	16	94	±1	82	82	72
SPRU <sup>6</sup>	2	2	2	100	0	100	0	70
SR <sup>7</sup>	30	30	30	100	0	90	90	88
WVDP	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	75
<b>EM Totals</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;65</b>

Location Key:

CBFO = Carlsbad Field Office  
 ID = Idaho Operations Office  
 OR = Oak Ridge Office

ORP = Office of River Protection  
 PPPO = Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office  
 RL = Richland Operations Office

SPRU = Separations Process Research Unit  
 SR = Savannah River Operations Office  
 WVDP = West Valley Demonstration Project

\* % Staff and % Qualified:

The number on board divided by the Analysis FTE.

\*\* % Oversight Time:

The number of hours spent in oversight activities divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours includes normal scheduled work and overtime, but not leave or special assignments greater than one week assigned.

Notes:

- 1 One ID (EM) FR is slated to transfer to ID (NE) upon startup of the Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Project.
- 2 One ORP FR retired and one was promoted to a supervisory position in the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) Engineering Division. ORP hired one FR from the WTP engineering organization. The promoted FR will maintain FR qualifications but not count for these statistics.
- 4 One PPPO FR is on long-term detail and has not started qualification.
- 5 One RL FR retired and one new FR was hired from within the WTP engineering organization.
- 6 All SPRU FRs are experienced and previously qualified at other sites. SPRU was planned as a project too short to support full qualification, but since it now is expected to last several years a qualification program is to be developed.
- 7 SR performed a new staffing analysis showing 30 vice 36 FRs required.

### **EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- ID (EM): The Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) FRs developed and presented training, and provided pre-operational support to startup teams and other staff during the startup of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU). The expert level of knowledge and excellent support contributed greatly to the safe and efficient completion of startup activities at IWTU.
- ID (EM): An INTEC FR performing routine operational awareness activities at the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit noted that during preparation for replacement of a rupture disc, the insulation pad had been removed from the wrong Granular Activated Carbon bed (bed B insulation removed but Bed A had the disc failure). The contractor insisted that the correct work location had been selected, but the FR persisted and was successful in getting the contractor to recognize their error. The FR's alertness and persistence prevented costly rework and delays to the project.

## Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

### **EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- ID (EM): A Radioactive Waste Management Complex FR assessment of the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project Senior Supervisory Watch (SSW) Oversight program identified multiple deficiencies with qualification, feedback, oversight focus, and reporting. The FR also observed two occasions where facility management failed to intervene when SSW performance failed to meet expectations in the contractor procedure. These issues were presented to the contractor and will result in improvement of the program.
- ID (EM): While performing a monitor watch of exhumation activities at the Accelerated Retrieval Project, a Radioactive Waste Management Complex FR recognized Fire Hazard Controls violation. The thermal imaging camera's view of the uncovered waste was obscured by the excavated dirt pile.
- OR (EM): An FR at the Tank W-1A project was instrumental in assisting the project to a successful completion. For this and other significant contributions he was selected as the OR (EM) Facility Representative of the Year.
- OR (EM): An FR at the Transuranic Waste Processing Facility identified an incorrect statement in the Startup and Restart of Nuclear Activities procedure, stating that unvented drum(s) can be vented in the Cask Processing Enclosure. This is not authorized in the documented safety analysis/technical safety requirement and was corrected.
- OR (EM): An FR at the Transuranic Waste Processing Facility identified five deficiencies in operator Aids in the Field during a routine surveillance. This led to an increased review schedule of operator aids by the contractor.
- OR (EM): An FR on the K-25 project observed a salamander heater underneath and in between the tracks of a bulldozer in the mechanics' work area. The heater burns petroleum fuel and has a powerful blower to generate high output for portable heating. This type of heat source combined with hydraulic and lubrication oil found on heavy equipment generated a potential fire hazard during maintenance activities. The location of the salamander heater under the bulldozer made it susceptible to oil leaks during maintenance activities. The concern was discussed with the K-25 facility manager, who committed to have the fire protection engineer review the use of the heaters in the maintenance area.
- OR (EM): An FR on the 3026 Hot Cell project reviewed a work package in preparation and provided extensive comments. Two weeks later the package was issued for final review but none of the Department of Energy (DOE) comments had been addressed. The FR briefed the project manager, who held a team meeting with his staff to lay out his expectations on the quality of work packages and held a joint review with DOE present to make sure everyone's comments were incorporated. This work package has yet to be issued and the FR continues to monitor.
- OR (EM): The FR on the K-25 project observed improper rigging plan changes in conflict with the work package. The job foreman believed he was authorized to make changes by virtue of his designation as a 'competent person rigger. The FR discussed the concern with the K-25 facility manager, who required that the work package be followed as written unless appropriate changes were made to the work package prior to the work occurring.
- OR (EM): FRs either led or participated in Readiness Reviews for the transuranic (TRU) project, Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE), 3026 Hot cell project, and 3517 Radioisotope Thermo Generators movement project over the past quarter.
- OR (EM): A FR reviewing the lockout/tagout (LO/TO) documentation at a Category 2 facility noticed that the tags were not labeled correctly. When the FR notified the contractor, it was determined that the contractor had filled out the tags properly but had hung them in the wrong location. The contractor took appropriate action to remedy the LO/TO.
- OR (EM): An FR at K-25 observed improper radiological contamination control procedures on two occasions and discussed them with the K-25 Facility Manager, who instituted pre-shift briefings to reinforce the radiological requirements.

## Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

### **EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- ORP: FRs observed improved contractor attention to performing monthly fire extinguisher inspections. Of the more than 2,500 fire extinguishers on site, one was identified as deficient.
- ORP: A WTP FR found compressed gas cylinders improperly secured. As a result of this finding, the contractor performed immediate actions to ensure that all compressed gas cylinders at the WTP construction site were properly secured.
- ORP: During a routine walk-down, an FR identified inconsistent application of Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards to temporary stair systems used for construction of WTP facilities. The contractor investigated and acknowledged the issue and took corrective actions.
- ORP: During a routine walk-down, an FR noted several large valves supported with rigging which had not been inspected properly. The FR notified management who took prompt action to inspect the rigging.
- ORP: An FR noted a worker who had stepped off a ladder and was standing on a scaffold tube and the edge of a wall. The worker was positioned above six feet and was not wearing any fall protection. The FR discussed the need to use fall protection and an appropriate working surface. The FR followed up with management, who took appropriate action to stop the work.
- ORP: An FR identified several facilities where the construction of partition walls resulted in improper exit signage because exits could no longer be seen from within the facility. The FR informed the contractor, who took prompt action to add exit signage.
- ORP: An FR identified a significant number of housekeeping deficiencies in one of the Tank Farms. The issues, with photos, were communicated to the facility managers who took action to eliminate the deficiencies.
- ORP: FRs identified several issues with work package preparation and review, work package execution, hazard control, and industrial health monitoring during work. All were passed to appropriate contractor management for correction and process improvement.
- ORP: During backshift oversight of C-112 retrieval operations, the FR observed that lighting within C Farm was very limited and not in accordance management expectations or previous corrective actions. Following notification of this condition to contractor management, all lighting within and adjacent to the farm was activated. The contractor has also held briefings of this condition with retrieval operations supervisors and is performing management reviews to ensure this condition does not recur.
- ORP: An FR identified several Conduct of Operations weaknesses while observing a transfer of radioactive waste from the 222-S Laboratory to the SY Tank Farm complex. The roles and responsibilities in the procedure were not clear, and operators were fulfilling duties that were slated for the Field Work Supervisor. The FR also noted that the procedure didn't provide nomenclature for gages used for data collection on liquid pump rates, and procedural steps didn't exist for the collection of this data, although the data was used to determine air pump blow down cycling frequency times. The FR met with the Waste Transfer Group to review the procedure and discuss the problems in detail.
- RL: FRs identified several fall protection and elevated work problems, including absence of required elements, missed inspections, and inappropriate walking and working platforms.
- RL: FRs identified several work authorization issues, including performance of work without completing prerequisites, procedural steps improperly performed or skipped, and inadequate work procedures.
- RL: FRs performed a site-wide Radiological Controls surveillance.

## Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

### **EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- RL: FRs identified fire extinguishers in several buildings were out of date or not inspected annually by the Fire Department.
- RL: FRs found uncontrolled hazardous material, first thought to contain asbestos, later found to be lead.
- SPRU: Due to project delays and funding concerns, the duration of the SPRU Project is now expected to be several years. DOE-SPRU is working with the DOE stakeholders to determine the path forward.
- SR: Office of Laboratory Oversight (OLO) FRs supported a review of the draft Justification for Continued Operations (JCO) and Revision 12 of the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) by providing comments to the contractor organization at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The JCO and Revision 12 of the TSRs were written in response to issues with the Fire Protection System identified by OLO FRs and a Headquarters Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) assessment team.
- SR: OLO FRs identified issues with radiological housekeeping in several laboratories at SRNL.
- SR: Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) FRs developed an effective project team communications and information sharing platform utilizing Microsoft One-Note software.
- SR: SWPF FRs identified and oversaw corrections to shortfalls in EPC contractor's air sampling plan for applying fire proof coatings to structural steel.
- SR: SWPF FRs identified a programmatic weakness in the Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contractor's competent persons program.
- SR: Nuclear Materials Operations Division (NMOD) FRs discovered that a route used to transfer transuranic (TRU) waste did not comply with the site procedure requirements for minimum distance to the site boundary. All TRU transfers using the route were suspended pending engineering evaluation. The contractor completed corrective actions and DOE verified them before shipments resumed.
- SR: NMOD FRs supported startup of the Purification Area Vault, including approval of the Documented Safety Analysis and oversight of the contractor Readiness Assessment.
- SR: Operations Oversight Division (OOD) FRs identified a safety issue at the SRS Biomass Cogeneration Facility involving an operator standing on the bed of a vehicle, leaning over a conveyor, and manually sampling the biomass fuel while the conveyor was in operation. In response, the contractor developed an operator aid which implemented a safer method of sampling.
- SR: OOD FRs identified fire safety and housekeeping issues in (3) University of Georgia senior staff offices at Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL). Corrective actions were implemented by SREL Director and Safety Manager.
- SR: Waste Disposition Operations Division (WDOD) FRs completed a Team Assessment covering a review of Tank Farm Technical Safety Requirement Surveillances. The review identified multiple Conduct of Operations issues and inadequate procedures.
- SR: One WDOD FR completed requalification.
- WVDP: One FR completed full qualification.

## Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

### **EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- WVDP: FRs focused on fire protection issues, including egress, combustibile loading, response planning, and updating the Fire Hazard Analysis.

# Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

## OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (NE)

<u>Location*</u>	<u>Analysis FTE</u>	<u>Approved FTE</u>	<u>Actual Staff</u>	<u>% Staff *</u>	<u>Gains / Losses</u>	<u>% Core Qualified *</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ID (NE)	9	9	8	89	0	100	89	93
<b>NE Totals</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;65</b>

\* Location Key:

ID = Idaho Operations Office

\* % Staff and % Qualified:

The number on board divided by the Analysis FTE.

\*\* % Oversight Time:

The number of hours spent in oversight activities divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours includes normal scheduled work and overtime, but not leave or special assignments greater than one week assigned.

Notes:

One ID (EM) FR is slated to transfer to ID (NE) upon startup of the Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Project.

### **NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- ID (NE): An Advanced Test Reactor Complex FR provided extended and focused oversight of contractor planning, team work, preparation and performance activities that resulted in the successful removal of a 200 Rem/hour hot spot from a primary coolant heat exchanger.
- ID (NE): An FR at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex provided oversight and real-time feedback to the contractor on development of effective corrective actions for the DOE Office of Enforcement Consent Order for the ATR Low Level Water Event, thus ensuring that the corrective actions put in place will improve the overall facility safety posture.
- ID (NE): A Materials and Fuels Complex FR observing the Battelle Research Reactor Cask operations at the Hot Fuels Examination Facility identified that the operating crew was outside the bounds of the operating instruction when they began performing system troubleshooting without stopping the work and revising the instruction.
- ID (NE): The Materials and Fuels Complex FRs provided oversight and real-time feedback to the contractor on development of effective corrective actions for the DOE Accident Investigation Board's Judgment of Needs for the Zero Power Physics Reactor Plutonium contamination event, thus ensuring that the corrective actions put in place will improve the overall facility safety posture.
- ID (NE): The Idaho FR leader was recognized as the 2011 Facility Representative of the Year.

# Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

## NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Analysis FTE</u>	<u>Approved FTE</u>	<u>Actual Staff</u>	<u>% Staff *</u>	<u>Gains / Losses</u>	<u>% Core Qualified *</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
LASO <sup>1</sup>	15	13	13	80	±1	80	67	73
LSO <sup>2</sup>	8	8	8	100	0	75	75	71
NSO	7	7	7	100	0	100	86	76
PXSO	10	9	9	90	0	90	90	85
SRSO	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	73
SSO	6	6	6	100	0	100	100	73
YSO <sup>3</sup>	9	9	9	100	+1	89	89	77
<b>NNSA Totals</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>+1</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;65</b>

Location Key:

LASO = Los Alamos Site Office  
LSO = Livermore Site Office

NSO = Nevada Site Office  
PXSO = Pantex Site Office

SRSO = Savannah River Site Office  
SSO = Sandia Site Office

YSO = Y-12 Site Office

\* % Staff and % Qualified:

The number on board divided by the Analysis FTE.

\*\* % Oversight Time:

The number of hours spent in oversight activities divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours includes normal scheduled work and overtime, but not leave or special assignments greater than one week assigned.

Notes:

- 1 One LASO FR transferred to another position within DOE; One new FR was hired through the NNSA Future Leaders Program.
- 2 LSO performed a new Staffing Analysis showing eight required FRs vice nine.
- 3 YSO hired one FR internally.

### **NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- LASO: An FR identified a failure to correct a known deficiency at the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing (RANT) Facility.
- LASO: FRs identified several instances of waste improperly staged, left uncontrolled, or un-containerized.
- LASO: An FR providing oversight of emergency drills and exercises identified repeat concerns regarding communication deficiencies with radios and offsite communications within the Facility Incident Command which hampered facility and off-site response.
- LASO: An FR identified a weakness in the facility Radiation Protection surveillance program associated with degraded outside radiological postings.
- LASO: An FR identified a concern with the controls associated with a Specific Administrative Control (Vehicle Refueling Exclusions) that led to a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis (PISA) review and positive Unresolved Safety Question Determination.
- LASO: AN FR identified a security issue where a sensitive area could be accessed by unauthorized personnel through a back stairwell which was not locked, posted or controlled.
- LSO: An FR recognized that a worker supporting an experiment using the Stage 2 Light Gas Gun at the High Explosives Application Facility was not authorized to perform work in accordance with the Integrated Work Sheet.

## Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

### **NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- LSO: A Contractor Assurance System assessment for Conduct of Operations by an FR identified that the contractor's institutional assessment plan was not implementing a systematic approach to assessing the Conduct of Operations effectiveness and was not involving the contractor's functional area manager and subject matter expert when assessing this program.
- LSO: As part of a Specific Administrative Control (SAC) assessment, an FR identified that a TSR-level SAC that was not included in an implementing document for operation of a furnace. The missing control was to limit use of oxygen gas during hydrogen generating operations. In addition, the FR identified another SAC, which restricts the size of hydrogen gas bottle connected to a glovebox, was not included in a different implementing procedure.
- NSO: Two FRs participated in the NNSA One Leadership Initiative Working Group in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
- NSO: FRs participated on Safety Basis Review Teams for changes to the Device Assembly Facility, and the National Criticality Experiments Research Center safety bases.
- NSO: An NSO FR identified that several Criticality Experiments Facility Operational Readiness Review findings were not properly closed in accordance with the DOE-approved corrective action plans.
- NSO: An FR developed and implemented an enhanced/streamlined DOE Order 422.1, *Conduct of Operations*, Applicability Matrix review resulting in an efficient use of federal and contractor time and rigor for the depth & breadth of the review.
- SRSO: The results from a March 2012 Triennial Assessment noted SRSO FRs to be well trained, aware of their responsibilities, actively engaged with the facility and performing their duties in an effective manner with no deficiencies being noted.
- SRSO: An FR performing routine nuclear facility walkthroughs identified a safety violation where a fire door was inappropriately propped open after work activities in the adjoining process room were completed. This issue was immediately reported to the central control room and corrected in the field.
- SSO: FRs completed an assessment of Sandia that identified several opportunities for improving formality of operations involving the use of toxic gases. As a result, Sandia has developed corrective actions that will ensure documenting independent verification of proper restricted flow orifices for these toxic gas cylinders.
- SSO: An SSO nuclear FR assisted National Training Center personnel in the development and instructing of SAF-261, *Conduct of Operations*, in Amarillo, Texas.
- YSO: FRs identified a deficiency related to continued facility deterioration.
- YSO: FRs conducted over 40 assessments in support of a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board concern related to procedure development, use, and adherence.
- YSO: One qualified FR completed cross-qualification for a second group of nuclear facilities.

## Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

### OFFICE OF SCIENCE (SC)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Analysis FTE</u>	<u>Approved FTE</u>	<u>Actual Staff</u>	<u>% Staff *</u>	<u>Gains / Losses</u>	<u>% Core Qualified *</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
AMES <sup>1</sup>	1	1	0.5	50	-1	100	0	30
ASO	7	4	4	57	0	57	57	80
BHSO	4	4	4	100	0	100	100	81
FSO	2	2	2	100	0	50	50	71
NBL <sup>1</sup>	1	1	0.5	50	0	100	100	66
OR (SC)	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	81
PNSO	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	70
<b>SC Totals</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;65</b>

Location Key:

AMES=AMES Site Office      BHSO = Brookhaven Site Office      NBL = New Brunswick Laboratory      PNSO = Pacific Northwest Site Office  
 ASO = Argonne Site Office      FSO = Fermi Site Office      OR = Oak Ridge Office

\* % Staff and % Qualified:  
 The number on board divided by the Analysis FTE.

\*\* % Oversight Time:  
 The number of hours spent in oversight activities divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours includes normal scheduled work and overtime, but not leave or special assignments greater than one week assigned.

Notes:

1. The Ames FR retired and the NBL FR is covering both Ames and NBL.

#### **SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- ASO: An FR conducted a review and provided comments on the updated Hazard Assessment Report for the Advanced Protein Crystallization Facility Project.
- ASO: An FR participated on the Accelerator Safety Working Group to rewrite DOE G 420.1-1.
- BHSO: All FRs participated in a site-wide surveillance of BNL workers compliance with personal protective equipment postings; and the postings compliance with local procedures. Several findings were identified.
- BHSO: An FR participated in the National Synchrotron Light Source-II Linac Commissioning Accelerator Readiness Review.
- BHSO: Two FRs assisted/facilitated the contractor in revising the BNL Accelerator Safety Subject Area. The Subject Area includes all aspects of accelerator safety such as Safety Assessment Documents, Accelerator Safety Envelopes, Unreviewed Safety Issues, and Accelerator Readiness Review.
- OR (SC): FRs conducted a coordinated assessment of Oak Ridge National Laboratory implementation of the Procedures and Operator Aids portions of the Conduct of Operations program.
- OR (SC): FRs conducted 89 walkthrough inspections, including 11 conducted jointly with Environment, Safety and Health Subject Matter Experts.
- PNSO: An FR identified improper labeling of glycol-mix containers. The issue was quickly corrected by contractor management.

## Facility Representative Performance Indicators January-March 2012

### **SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- PNSO: An FR identified a more effective implementation of procedures at the Hanford Site Emergency Operations Center (EOC) which was incorporated in training for all EOC personnel.
- PNSO: FRs supported Site Office efforts to implement a local approval process for Severity Category 3 Occurrence Reports per the January 2011 Order revision.
- PNSO: An FR followed removal of Pretreatment Engineering Platform equipment from Laboratory facility. Work in the privately owned building was done under another DOE office contractor's work control system. The work control arrangement appeared effective and the work was accomplished without significant incident.
- PNSO: An FR assisted with Safety System Oversight assessments for Fire Suppression System and Natural Phenomenon Hazards.
- PNSO: An FR followed two undeclared hazardous material shipping events reportable under the new Occurrence Reporting criterion effective January 1. Neither event was under the direct control of Laboratory contractor. The FR is supporting Site Office efforts to gain an interpretation for the criterion to only apply where a DOE contractor was the shipper.
- PNSO: An FR followed contractor response to an exposed energized electrical event nearly identical to a similar event two years ago. Contractor causal analysis and corrective action development are being followed closely for breadth and completeness.
- PNSO: An FR identified damaged electrical switch on a blower unit and notified facility management. Subsequent inspection of the unit (and other similar units) found additional electrical non compliances. Blowers have been removed from service pending resolution of electrical issues.
- PNSO: An FR participated in a turnover review of lab remodeling activities. The FR identified several valve labeling and valve location concerns that were subsequently resolved.

**Distribution List for Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators  
Quarterly Report, January – March 2012:**

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