



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

June 15, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

ANDREW C. LAWRENCE
DIRECTOR

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY, QUALITY ASSURANCE
AND ENVIRONMENT
OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY

SUBJECT:

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly
Report, January – March (First Quarter CY 2010)

Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from January through March 2010. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD)-1063-2006, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program. Highlights from this report are presented below.

FR Staffing/Qualification/Oversight Data

DOE was staffed at 188 FR Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) during this reporting period. For this quarter, a summary of the FR staffing and qualification and oversight data is:

- 86% Fully Qualified (DOE goal is > 80%);
- 92% Staffing Level (DOE goal is 100%);
- 44% Time Spent in the Field (DOE goal is > 40%); and
- 75% Time Spent in Oversight Activities (DOE Goal is > 65%).

FR Program Highlights

The Fully Qualified FR level increased from 81% to 86% during this reporting period, further exceeding the DOE goal of 80%. The increase can be attributed to several factors including a low FR attrition rate translating to a smaller need to fill FR vacancies, FRs successfully completing initial qualification, and revised Site FR staffing analyses lowering FTE requirements.

The FR Steering Committee holds monthly teleconferences to share information on oversight activities, issues identified, and FR program initiatives and improvements. During this quarter's calls, FRs identified numerous issues related to lockouts/tagouts, use of personal protective equipment, and radiological controls. Descriptions of these and other observations, as well as FR Program highlights, are provided in the attachment. The sharing of information on these issues benefits all FRs in performing their oversight activities with the goal of providing useful feedback to the contractors to support working safely at DOE hazardous facilities.



Current FR information and past quarterly performance indicator reports are accessible at the FR web site at **Http://www.hss.energy.gov/deprep/facrep/**. Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me (202) 586-5680 or the DOE FR Program Manager, James Heffner at (202) 586-3690.

Attachment

OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (EM)

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (1QCY2010)

| <u>Field or Ops Office</u> | <u>Staffing Analysis</u> | <u>FTEs</u> | <u>Actual Staffing</u> | <u>% Staffing</u> | <u>Attrition</u> | <u>% Core Qualified</u> | <u>% Fully Qualified</u> | <u>% Field Time *</u> | <u>% Oversight Time **</u> |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| CBFO | 3 | 3 | 3 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 33 | 50 | 78 |
| ID (EM) | 13 | 13 | 12 | 92 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 50 | 91 |
| OR (EM) | 18 | 17 | 18 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 81 | 45 | 67 |
| ORP | 15 | 15 | 14 | 93 | 1 | 93 | 80 | 51 | 81 |
| PPPO | 6 | 6 | 6 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 43 | 68 |
| RL | 19 | 19 | 19 | 100 | 0 | 95 | 95 | 43 | 69 |
| SPRU | 1 | 1 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 50 | 75 |
| SR | 32 | 29 | 29 | 91 | 1 | 69 | 69 | 43 | 76 |
| WVDP | 2 | 2 | 2 | 100 | 0 | 50 | 50 | 37 | 60 |
| EM Totals | 109 | 105 | 104 | 95 | 2 | 89 | 81 | 45 | 75 |
| DOE GOALS | - | - | - | 100 | - | - | >80 | >40 | >65 |

* Field or Ops Office Key:

CBFO = Carlsbad Field Office; ID = Idaho Operations Office; OR = Oak Ridge Office; ORP = Office of River Protection; PPPO = Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office; RL = Richland Operations Office; SR = Savannah River Operations Office; SPRU = Separation Process Research Unit ; WVDP = West Valley Demonstration Project

** % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays, nor does it include special assignments greater than 1 week assigned by the Field Element Manager.

*** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- ID (EM): A Facility and Materials Disposition (FMDP) FR served on the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Phase II Verification team for the Plateau Remediation Project at Hanford, W A. The FR validated that Operations were sufficiently mature to support ISMS. The Richland Operations Office Manager commended the FR for her supporting role in investigation of significant issues identified by the verification team.
- ID (EM): A Waste Disposition Project (WDP) FR identified that the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) contractor failed to properly implement controls related to the use of propane cylinders as required by the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). Failure to implement FHA commitments could result in operation outside of the assumptions of the Safety Basis.
- ID (EM): A WDP FR noted operators at AMWTP took recovery actions during an abnormal event without the protection of established work controls or procedures and without consulting appropriate support organizations (i.e., radiological safety and industrial safety). The event in question was not an emergency situation, and immediate actions were not warranted to stabilize or mitigate the situation.
- ID (EM): During an operational awareness tour of a waste storage facility, a WDP FR identified the stacking of waste drums not in accordance with the allowable stacking tolerances specified in the operating procedure. Improper stacking could result in unstable configurations in a waste drum stack or cause an adjacent waste drum to be forced out of the waste stack.
- ID (EM): Throughout the quarter, the assigned FMDP FR team performed multiple targeted surveillances of spent fuel transfers being performed at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) on the backshift and weekends. An FR documented an increasingly better performance at pre-job briefings, operator involvement/ownership of operating procedures and operating procedure use.

- ID (EM): Throughout the quarter, the FMDP FR team performed multiple targeted surveillances of remote handled transuranic (RH-TRU) work being performed at INTEC on the backshift and weekends. The FR documented a continuing weakness in compliance with regulatory requirements. Multiple findings were issued for the failure to maintain the facility configuration described in the documented safety analysis (DSA), the improper use of the maintenance categorical exclusion option for the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process for maintenance having the potential to affect the DSA, the deficient implementation of project and safety basis requirements documents during the readiness reviews conducted for startup of RH-TRU waste repackaging operations in the Fluorinel Dissolution Process Area (FDPA), and the failure to flow down fire protection and Hot Work Permit requirements.
- OR (EM): EnergX, LLC was conducting a pre-job brief for entry into a hot cell, which included welding. The FR expressed concern that during this welding, sparks would be generated if the material wasn't adequately cleaned, and that use of the vacuum system for fume removal without a spark arrestor could present a hazard. After sparks were observed during the welding, EnergX stopped the welding and installed a spark arrestor on the vacuum.
- OR (EM): One FR served on a temporary Federal Project Director assignment.
- ORP: An FR helped identify several electrical noncompliance's which lead to improvement.
- ORP: An FR identified a storage cabinet used to store radioactive sources that was unlocked and uncontrolled. Ensuring correction of this issue significantly decreases the chances for an unintended radiological exposure.
- ORP: An FR identified an emerging trend for dropped objects; feedback to the contractor led to assigning interfering scaffolding related work to a swing shift thus minimizing potential day shift work activity interferences for overhead work.
- ORP: An FR identified less than adequate survey devices in the change trailer which could lead to improper doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE) and surveys.
- ORP: An FR identified that training requirements for radiological workers performing containment work did not require refresher training. Some individuals performing glovebag work had not been trained within the past eight years. The same deficiency was noted for those Health Physicist Technicians that were qualified to perform certifications of containments. A refresher training requirement did not exist, although on-the-job training (OJT) did exist. The OJT did not require and document a check of knowledge retention for this qualification. The correction of these deficiencies will reduce the risk of radiological upset at the facility.
- ORP: An FR identified two radiological portable survey instruments located on the ground left unattended and in the on position in the morning. The instruments had been staged on the ground unprotected and in the weather since the grave yard shift.
- ORP: An FR observed two non-compliances with procedural requirements during the removal of the Radiation Monitor from SY Tank Farm. The FR identified a rigging sling in the process of being attached that was out of certification and a craftsman manipulating potentially contaminated equipment without the required leather gloves.
- ORP: An FR performed a comparison of Hot Work requirements, related to fire protection, to field conditions; feedback given to the contractor resulted in disestablishment of some hot work areas and additional emphasis on removal of combustible materials.
- ORP: One FR accepted a position as the Deputy Federal Project Director for the Low Activity Waste Facility, LAB Facility and Balance of Facilities.

- ORP: While observing work in the Tank Farms, an FR discovered poor radiological control (radcon) work practices in the field. These included improper boundary control by radcon first line supervisors, improper use of anti-contamination clothing, poor glovebag work practices, improper storage and handling techniques for packaged radiological waste, and improper posting of High Contamination Areas. The correction of these deficiencies will reduce the risk of radiological upset at the facility.
- ORP: While observing work in the Tank Farms, an FR identified that several radcon work practices were not consistent with documented contractor requirements or training methods. The radcon work practices were not consistently applied at Tank Farms. Further training requirements were not proceduralized, and management at tank farms was not aware of the trained requirements. Examples of this include personnel not performing source checks prior to frisking, personnel not reading Direct Reading Dosimeters while in Radiation Areas, and personnel working in a glovebag on tank contacted waste without determining or maintaining contamination levels within the glovebag. The correction of these deficiencies will reduce the risk of radiological upset at the facility.
- RL: An FR brought up issues related to electrical LO/TO evolutions at U Canyon. Discrepancies were identified in the LO/TO sequence, verification of test equipment for proper operation, correct nomenclature between Tagout Authorization Form, danger tags, and equipment labeling.
- RL: An FR brought up issues with exposed electrical contactors located on newly installed temporary generators used to supply electrical power to American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) trailers. Other issues included electrical isolations, control of equipment, proper grounding for temporary generators.
- RL: An FR continued to evaluate and provide feedback on labeling/configuration management issues.
- RL: An FR identified construction workers without required PPE.
- RL: An FR identified contractor had not completed hostile environment work plan requirements associated with Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) canyon crane, which are the minimum level of controls necessary for safe operation of the canyon crane to decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) pencil tanks.
- RL: An FR identified failure for Westinghouse Hanford Company (WCH) Waste Operations Mechanic shop to follow existing maintenance procedure and Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) requirements.
- RL: An FR identified safety issues related to personnel working off of elevated platforms and the inconsistent use of safety/guard chains at access points leading to the platforms.
- RL: An FR identified system breeching into contaminated uranium trioxide (UO₃) systems without requiring the use of respiratory equipment, causing uptake exposure to D&D workers. Two instances occurred during this past quarter, which led to requesting a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) from the contractor as identified in a recently performed Work Control surveillance.
- RL: An FR identified training practices that placed students at risk of being sprayed in face/eyes with hazardous chemical.
- SPRU: The FR identified safety issues regarding personnel working too close to an excavation face, electrical safety issues, unmitigated potential silica dust hazard during concrete demolition, hot work, and fall protection.
- SPRU: The FR performed oversight of electrical safety corrective actions, excavation safety, fall protection safety, and demolition.
- SR: Four FR's completed initial qualification, and one FR left for a non-FR position.

- SR: One Assistant Manager Nuclear Materials Stabilization Project FR was instrumental in updating the H Canyon DSA to be compliant with DOE-STD-3009.
- SR: The K Area FRs identified significant deficiencies in the performance of Shift Manager Oral Boards.
- WVDP: An FR conducted three monthly FR assessments focused on conduct of operations and integrated safety management. New issues identified included ingress/egress with the Main Plant Process Building to account for work areas being off limits; contractor being non-compliant with their own procedure regarding Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) reporting; pre-job briefing locations free of distractions; overuse of the site's All Page systems; exterior lights on during the day; and site maintenance issues given changed office space locations and weather conditions.
- WVDP: The FR completed requalification in March.
- WVDP: The FR-in-training provided EM Program support at Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Separation Process Research Unit.

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (NE)

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (1QCY2010)

| <u>Field or Ops Office</u> | <u>Staffing Analysis</u> | <u>FTEs</u> | <u>Actual Staffing</u> | <u>% Staffing</u> | <u>Attrition</u> | <u>% Core Qualified</u> | <u>% Fully Qualified</u> | <u>% Field Time *</u> | <u>% Oversight Time **</u> |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| ID (NE) | 11 | 11 | 8 | 73 | 1 | 100 | 100 | 44 | 77 |
| NE Totals | 11 | 11 | 8 | 73 | 1 | 100 | 100 | 44 | 77 |
| DOE GOALS | - | - | - | 100 | - | - | >80 | >40 | >65 |

* Field or Ops Office Key:
ID = Idaho Operations Office

** % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays, nor does it include special assignments greater than 1 week assigned by the Field Element Manager.

*** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- ID (NE): An FR at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex identified that a safety shower was not being properly maintained for use and communicated the issue to the contractor who resolved the deficiency.
- ID (NE): An FR at the Research and Education Campus (REC) followed a strong odor of solvent and discovered painters applying a two-part floor coating without ventilation. The FR determined that contrary to the requirements of the paint product labels, material safety data sheets (MSDSs), and the direction of the cognizant Industrial Hygiene (IH) representative, that craft personnel had requested, and building management personnel had complied with, securing area ventilation during painting activities.
- ID (NE): An FR at REC performing an operational awareness walkdown, discovered workers performing installation of a large blower, grinder, and separator equipment at a laboratory facility using a crane and involving work at heights, without the work being scheduled on the plan of the week (POW) or plan of the day (POD), and therefore without authorization to be worked.
- ID (NE): An FR at the Specific Manufacturing Capability (SMC) discovered that an operator round sheet previously identified by the FR as incorrect, had been twice revised by the contractor. The first revision corrected the error, but a second revision erroneously reinstated the initial error. The document management process was not functioning accurately and effectively.
- ID (NE): An SMC FR reviewing contractor operations and work control noted that production lines with similar equipment and production activities, with identical hazards and mitigations, were controlled using different levels of work procedures. One line used a Technical Procedure, another used an Operating Guide, and a third used a Laboratory Instruction.
- ID (NE): An SMC FR discovered that high power laser optics were not being maintained in accordance with contractor and manufacturer procedures for cleanliness. Such failures could lead to equipment damage.
- ID (NE): FRs at Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) identified several issues with the LO/TO process. These errors, while administrative in nature, indicate a lack of attention to detail in the preparation, execution, and removal of LO/TO's.

- ID (NE): FRs at the ATR Complex identified several deficiencies with performance of "high risk" operational procedures and communicated the deficiencies to the contractor resulting in concerted effort on the part of the contractor to improve procedure clarity and performance.
- ID (NE): MFC FRs identified several instances where the Contractors event investigation process was not effective. Process problems included the failure to receive personnel statements prior to the critique, failure to capture corrective actions identified in the critique, and failure to conduct a thorough investigation of the event.
- ID (NE): Several FRs from the ATR Complex provided oversight assistance for startup of RH-TRU waste repackaging and characterization work at INTEC.

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA)

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (1QCY2010)

| <u>Site Office</u> | <u>Staffing Analysis</u> | <u>FTEs</u> | <u>Actual Staffing</u> | <u>% Staffing</u> | <u>Attrition</u> | <u>% Core Qualified</u> | <u>% Fully Qualified</u> | <u>% Field Time *</u> | <u>% Oversight Time **</u> |
|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| LASO | 13 | 12 | 12 | 92 | 0 | 83 | 75 | 45 | 74 |
| LSO | 10 | 10 | 7 | 70 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 42 | 73 |
| NSO | 7 | 7 | 6.5 | 93 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 50 | 76 |
| PXSO | 10 | 9 | 9 | 90 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 45 | 68 |
| SRSO | 3 | 3 | 3 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 50 | 81 |
| SSO | 8 | 8 | 8 | 100 | 0 | 88 | 88 | 36 | 81 |
| YSO | 12 | 11 | 10 | 83 | 0 | 90 | 90 | 45 | 75 |
| NNSA Totals | 63 | 60 | 55.5 | 88 | 0 | 93 | 91 | 44 | 75 |
| DOE GOALS | - | - | - | 100 | - | - | >80 | >40 | >65 |

* Field or Ops Office Key:

LASO = Los Alamos Site Office; LSO = Livermore Site Office; NSO = Nevada Site Office; PXSO = Pantex Site Office; SRSO = Savannah River Site Office; SSO = Sandia Site Office; YSO = Y-12 Site Office

** % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays, nor does it include special assignments greater than 1 week assigned by the Field Element Manager.

*** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- LASO: An FR identified a finding on poor work control and inadequate procedure implementation of a Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) related high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) ventilation filter change out.
- LASO: An FR identified a Specific Administrative Control (SAC) violation during the Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility (WCRRF) Annual Emergency Exercise.
- LASO: An FR identified an unsafe condition in PF-6 due to refrigerant monitor being out of calibration resulting in the implementation of compensatory measures.
- LASO: An FR identified improper location of refrigerant sensing lines in PF-6 which would have prevented proper operation of the refrigerant alarm.
- LASO: An FR issued a finding for the failure to completely execute In-Service Inspection of Tritium Gas Handling System Design Feature 4, WETF-TGHS-ISI-01, Rev A.
- LASO: An FR issued a finding for the failure to perform In-Service Inspection of Tritium Gas Handling System Design Feature 4, WETF-TGHS-ISI-01, Rev A. for entire system within required frequency.
- LASO: An FR issued a finding that resulted in the issuance of a standing order which requires Facility Operations Director (FOD) approval of all work scope, hazards, and controls for all activities within FOD-9 (TA-21). Previously that was done by project managers with no FOD involvement.
- LASO: An FR issued a finding where the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) TSR definition of a Violation was in conflict with the TSR Violation criterion described in DOE M 231.1-2.

- LSO: An FR identified multiple pressure relief devices that were either overdue for inspection in a number of facilities, which resulted in identification of a weakness.
- LSO: An FR performed verification of closure to prestart issues identified during the Tritium Grinder System Readiness Assessment.
- LSO: An FR provided oversight of repackaging of legacy transuranic (TRU) waste containers that was discovered at a high explosives area.
- LSO: At the High Explosives Application Facility, an FR completed a detailed review of the gun tank impact carriage system to determine whether a situation existed that could result in a similar abnormal event at an explosives facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
- LSO: During review of a TSR change request of the hydrogen gas control system and toxic gas control system, an FR identified incorrect component locations and assignments for these safety-significant systems, structures and components (SSCs). This resulted in the contractor preparing a revision to this change request to correct these inaccuracies.
- LSO: FRs performed coordinated assessments of selected chapters of DOE O 5480.19 at all nuclear facilities and selected non-nuclear facilities.
- LSO: While observing the contractor's response to a bulging container filled with potentially contaminated mop water, an FR identified that the contractor was incorrectly using the work control process for emergency work activities on equipment important to safety. Identification of this issue has led the contractor to revise its work control process.
- NSO: NSO FRs are provided valuable independent oversight support to the NSO Program Managers for three nuclear facility start-up activities.
- NSO: The FR Group supported the Sidewinder 10 Full Scale Emergency Exercise as part of their collateral duties manning the Emergency Management Center.
- NSO: The Device Assembly Facility/Criticality Experiments Facility (DAF/CEF) FR discovered that offices for facility personnel had been recently established in a non-blast protected area, contrary to DSA commitments. The FRs worked with facility management to have the facility personnel relocated to blast protected areas.
- NSO: The Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC) FR provided intense document review and operational oversight during explosive mixing and detonation operations at the NPTEC Port Gaston Facility.
- NSO: The required full time equivalent (FTE) coverage level was reduced by two, partly due to multiple low hazard facilities now being covered by exception only. Currently 0.5 FTE is being provided to the FR Group through matrixed support from outside the group.
- PXSO: An FR successfully completed his Site Specific qualifications in March 2010.
- SRSO: During February, FRs initiated Enhanced Oversight activities to monitor the contractor's performance during back-shift hours following a series of conduct of operations events. The results from these activities were shared with senior contractor management representatives for resolution.
- SRSO: During March, FRs performed Enhanced Oversight coverage during the receipt of Cycle 9 Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods in the Tritium Extraction Facility.

- SRSO: The Senior FR was assigned to the Governance Steering Committee which is overseeing the implementation of the new governance initiative at the SRSO. The committee will also work to redefine the Federal and Contractor relationship to ultimately improve management and performance.
- SSO: An FR participated in a review and observation of the Rocket Sled Track Facility restart after completion of corrective actions from a Type B Accident Investigation.
- SSO: FRs provided oversight for the transport of Hazard Category 3 containers from the Manzano Nuclear Facilities to the Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility (SPRF).
- SSO: The Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) FR completed an assessment documenting verification of calendar year 2009 TSRs compliance.
- SSO: The ACRR FR observed most of the procedures for the ACRR TSRs Annual Surveillance Requirements (rod drop time, transient rod calibrations, etc.) and has prepared an assessment to document satisfactory completion.
- SSO: The SPRF FR Reviewed the Safety Evaluation Report Addendum for conducting Real Time Radiography (RTR) at the SPRF, verified RTR interlocks were in effect prior to conducting operations, and observed several RTR operations.
- SSO: The SPRF FR conducted an assessment of the SPRF 7% Critical Experiments for a new core configuration characterized in February 2010. This assessment, conducted over four working days, included his independent calculations/verification of 1/M plotting and estimated critical loading based upon count rate data.
- SSO: The SPRF FR is nearing completion of his 3rd requalification on the SPRF and SPRF/Critical Experiments.
- YSO: An FR identified a violation of a SAC which constituted a TSR violation during a fissile material container transfer operation.
- YSO: The Site Office hired a new Lead Operations Engineer, allowing one FR to return to the Group 3 facilities.
- YSO: Two FRs supported the NA-24 Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Program with a special monitoring visit to Seversk, Russia.

OFFICE OF SCIENCE (SC)

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (1QCY2010)

| <u>Area/Site Office</u> | <u>Staffing Analysis</u> | <u>FTEs</u> | <u>Actual Staffing</u> | <u>% Staffing</u> | <u>Attrition</u> | <u>% Core Qualified</u> | <u>% Fully Qualified</u> | <u>% Field Time *</u> | <u>% Oversight Time **</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| AMES | 1 | 1 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 24 | 75 |
| ASO | 5 | 5 | 4 | 80 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 18 | 85 |
| BHSO | 4 | 4 | 4 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 58 | 85 |
| FSO | 2 | 2 | 2 | 100 | 0 | 50 | 50 | 38 | 68 |
| NBL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 36 | 65 |
| OR (SC) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 44 | 79 |
| PNSO | 3 | 3 | 3 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 41 | 75 |
| SC Totals | 21 | 21 | 20 | 95 | 0 | 95 | 90 | 39 | 79 |
| DOE GOALS | - | - | - | 100 | - | - | >80 | >40 | >65 |

* Field or Ops Office Key

AMES=AMES Site Office; ASO = Argonne Site Office; BHSO = Brookhaven Site Office; FSO = Fermi Site Office; NBL = New Brunswick Laboratory; OR = Oak Ridge Office; PNSO = Pacific Northwest Site Office

** % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays, nor does it include special assignments greater than 1 week assigned by the Field Element Manager.

*** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- ASO: An FR completed a critical review of an initial cell entry work package and safety evaluation for the Building 200 MA hot cell facility.
- ASO: Building 205 K-Wing is on track to be less than Hazard Category 3 in FY 2010.
- BHSO: All four FRs participated in the DOE Accident Investigation Course this period and are now qualified DOE Accident Investigators.
- BHSO: One FR led a collaborative assessment of the contractor's laser and non-ionizing radiation safety programs. Several findings were identified.
- BHSO: Several FRs participated in a Subject Matter Expert led assessment of the contractor's electrical safety program concerning experiments. Many findings were identified.
- FSO: FRs were involved in Contractor Assurance Assessment follow-up activities, a Fermilab Safety Documentation Update, Regulatory Permitting and Reporting, and an Accelerator Safety Order Revision during this reporting period.
- NBL: In association with a perchloric acid wash down activity, the FR walked down the ventilation systems and found ductwork for a former perchloric acid hood to be contaminated with crystalline formations near the motor assembly. NBL will develop a plan for sampling and quantitatively determining whether the residue contains perchlorates.
- NBL: In response to 3.8 magnitude earthquake that struck northern Illinois on February 10, 2010, the FR surveyed for any earthquake-related damage (none was found) before commencing work.

- OR (SC): A coordinated assessment was conducted of Technical Safety Requirement and Credited Engineering Control implementation at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) nuclear facilities and the Spallation Neutron Source. This assessment was completed jointly by the FRs, and an overall assessment report was prepared.
- OR (SC): During this reporting period, 80 walkthroughs were conducted and documented on the ORION tracking system. Fifteen of these walkthroughs were conducted jointly with Environment, Safety, and Health subject matter experts.
- OR (SC): One FR completed qualification on Building 3025E.
- PNSO: A review of the FR program at PNSO was conducted in March 2010 to satisfy the requirement of DOE-STD-1063-2006, Facility Representatives. The overall grade for the assessment was satisfactory. The elements to make an effective FR Program were found in place and functioning. Three program objectives were rated adequate and two rated excellent.
- PNSO: An FR contributed to Site Office review of the contractor corrective action plan for the August 2009 inadvertent weapon discharge at the HAMMER facility. Comments provided gained better linkage between planned actions and recommendations made in the event causal analysis.
- PNSO: An FR identified concern regarding a facility exit that was partially blocked with construction materials at the Hanford 325 Building. Issue was elevated to facility management and resolved.
- PNSO: An FR identified concern regarding questionable forklift handling practice at the Hanford 325 Building. Issue was communicated to facility management and resolved.
- PNSO: An FR review of completed contractor corrective actions from a May 2009 fire event in the Applied Process Engineering Laboratory (APEL) facility identified that closure of several actions had been incomplete and inappropriate. Internal Site Office discussion prepared the Site Office Manager to address the issue with the Laboratory Director. The effort achieved recognition and recommitment of Laboratory management to appropriately address the fire response issues.
- PNSO: During a sample review of the contractor's LO/TO log, an FR identified several implementation deficiencies with their process. The deficiencies were formally reported to the contractor and were entered into the contractor's issue management system for resolution.
- PNSO: During his review of the ORPS occurrence report for the Hanford 329 Building fire, an FR determined that contractor actions to prevent recurrence were not identified in the report. Comments provided by the FR ensured the report clearly linked appropriate corrective actions to the factors identified during the causal analysis.
- PNSO: FR follow-up to a carbon monoxide alarm in a laboratory in the Bioproducts, Sciences, and Engineering Laboratory (BSEL) facility raised questions not addressed by contractor response actions on calibration and recall of the monitors. Discussions resulted in contractor commitment to develop a routine calibration approach as the monitors are relied on to initiate personnel response.
- PNSO: FRs contributed to Site Office review of the Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) submitted by the contractor to allow continued operations at the Hanford 325 Building following identification of a positive USQ affecting building inventory limits. The review resulted in comments returned to the contractor and led to a revised JCO being submitted that was more credible and contained a more straightforward approach to interim inventory controls.

- PNSO: FRs have been contributing to Site Office efforts to improve and streamline internal activity reporting efforts. Electronic tools are being tailored to automate Site Office information sharing and FR contributions are being used to pilot the efforts.