



**Department of Energy**  
Washington, DC 20585

September 20, 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION**

FROM: John D. Evans  
Facility Representative Program Manager  
Office of the Departmental Representative to the  
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DR-1)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John D. Evans", written over the typed name.

SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report

Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from April to June 2004. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per DOE-STD-1063-2000, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback in order to improve the FR Program.

As of June 30, 2004, 89% of all FRs were fully qualified, exceeding the DOE goal of 80%, but down slightly from the previous quarter. Twenty of 28 reporting sites meet the goal for FR qualifications. Overall FR staffing is at 85% of the levels needed per the staffing analysis methodology in DOE-STD-1063-2000.

Ten site offices currently meet all the DOE goals for the performance indicators (i.e., staffing 100%, qualification 80%, FR Time in Field 40%, FR Total Oversight Time 60%). These site offices are: Carlsbad, Brookhaven, Princeton, Fernald, West Valley, Pacific Northwest, River Protection, Richland, Rocky Flats, and Y-12.

Current FR information and past quarterly performance indicator reports are accessible at the FR Web Site. Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me at 202-586-3887.

Attachment

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report  
September 20, 2004

**Distribution:**

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Milt Johnson, SC-3	Manager, Richland Operations Office
William Magwood, NE-1	Manager, Rocky Flats Project Office
	Manager, Sandia Site Office
	Manager, Savannah River Operations Office
	Manager, Savannah River Site Office (NNSA)
	Manager, Y-12 Site Office

**cc:**

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## ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2004)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Carlsbad	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	60	65
Idaho (EM)	11	10	9.5	86	0	100	100	41	81
Oak Ridge (EM)	20	14	14	70	0	93	93	45	64
OH/Fernald	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	45	77
OH/Miamisburg	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	39	61
OH/West Valley	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	45	67
Portsmouth/Paducah	4	4	4	100	0	50	50	27	58
Richland	17	17	17	100	1	100	100	45	70
River Protection	11	11	11	100	0	100	100	51	77
Rocky Flats	4	4	7	175	0	100	100	65	75
Savannah River	35	28	28	80	1	100	100	58	88
<b>EM Totals</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>101.5</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	-	-	-	<b>100</b>	-	-	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

\* % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the total available work hours in the quarter. The total available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays.

\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

### EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Idaho (EM), an FR at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center spent considerable time overseeing preparations for removal of hydrofluoric acid (HF) cylinders from the CPP-84 Buried Cylinder Cleanup Site, including an extensive drill addressing the hazards of HF gas leakage. On June 24<sup>th</sup> a Site Area Emergency was declared at the INEEL following discovery of a leaking HF gas cylinder. The FR responded and manned the Emergency Control Center for the duration of the event. Primarily due to the thoroughness of preparations, the response to the HF gas leak resolved the emergency quickly and with minimal risk to personnel.
- At Oak Ridge (EM), FRs working with subject matter experts identified significant programmatic deficiencies in the Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC hoisting and rigging program. Also, an FR stopped a lift that was not properly rigged and worked with the contractor to ensure the lift was subsequently completed safely.
- At OH/Fernald, FRs identified a trend in workers of a specific organization not using required PPE. The situation was corrected.
- At OH/Miamisburg, FRs discussed the need for proper and improved equipment with contractor management to avoid unnecessary worker exposure due to inefficiency of current equipment, and prolonged maintenance while removing floor concrete. Equipment is on order.
- At OH/West Valley, both FRs assisted with preparations for the DOE-ORR for the Remote Handled Waste Facility. Also, an FR participated in a surveillance of hoisting and rigging activities associated with removal of a large vessel from Extraction Cell – 2. The team identified miscalculations in the equipment specifications that would have made the lift out of specifications.
- At Richland, an FR at the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project recognized the potential for a high airborne radioactivity condition being caused by leak-by of a contaminated system pressure relief valve. Air samples conducted as a result of the FRs questions confirmed a high airborne condition.
- At River Protection, an FR took immediate action to correct one worker who was working approximately 21 feet above a concrete slab without using fall protection equipment. The worker immediately began using the safety equipment and the safety manager briefed workers on the incident.
- At Savannah River, an FR at FB-Line identified implementation issues from an automated hazard analyses. Additional hazards were identified and controls were incorporated into the work. Also, an H-Canyon FR determined a rubber hose used to unload 50% nitric acid was incompatible for that service. The hose was a Fabchem (Goodyear) hose and was listed in the vendor catalog as not acceptable for >37% acid. As a result, the facility began immediate actions to replace the hose and investigate the faulty hose selection process.

## NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2004)

<u>Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Livermore	9	9	9	100	0	78	78	50	65
Los Alamos	16	16	14	88	1	100	54	33	50
Nevada	10	7	6	60	0	100	67	39	66
Pantex	15	7	6	40	1	100	100	37	70
Sandia	12	8	8	67	0	63	63	37	70
Savannah River	3	3	2	67	0	100	100	60	83
Y-12	9	9	9	100	1	100	89	50	80
<b>NNSA Totals</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

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### NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Livermore, the Waste Management FR worked closely with LLNL personnel on the TRUWASTE Mobile Vendor packaging facility. The operations to reduce the TRU radioactive waste inventory at LLNL is proceeding smoothly with approximately 580 to 700 drums through the main drum handling operations and about 110 repackaged. An RA to begin TRU Waste TRUPACK II loading and unloading was accomplished and preparations for WIPP shipping are underway.
- At Los Alamos, during a walkdown of safety class/safety significant systems in Wing 9 of the CMR facility, FRs uncovered a situation where a safety significant system, a manipulator boot seal, had had no designated "pedigree" assigned to it by the facility. The seal, installed to prevent contamination from escaping the hot cells, had no designated performance requirements/specifications, procurement requirements, or inspection requirements. The facility has since updated the System Design Description and incorporated the requirements for procurement level and performance into the work process. The facility had incorporated functional requirements, performance criteria and TSR controls into the BIO update.
- At Nevada, two FRs participated as members of the safety and operational review of LLNL NTS operations for the high explosive test at BEEF. Significant input was provided and concerns were passed on to the Team Leader and NSO Line Management for the final report.
- At Pantex, two FRs completed weapons-specific hazard training. Also, FRs performed various assessments including on combustible controls and safety system maintenance performance and tracking. Many issues were identified, including identification of three technical safety requirement violations.
- At Sandia, an FR responded to a personnel contamination event at TA-V ensuring an adequate response and corrective action plan were provided. Also, FRs participated as observers during the NNSA Operational Readiness Review for initial startup of the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility. Another SSO FR participated and reviewed Conduct of Operations for the ORR.
- At Y-12, an FR made two trips to the Seversk ElectroChemical Enterprise in Russia to support the HEU transparency program. The FR made several unique observations to this valuable international non-proliferation program. Also, an FR observed contractor maintenance personnel improperly performing safety-significant maintenance. The maintenance personnel replaced a safety-significant seismic switch after marking the post maintenance test complete. The FR's actions ensured a safety-significant component was properly replaced and tested.
- At Savannah River, FRs provided extended 24-hour coverage of an abnormal operating procedure.

## OFFICE OF SCIENCE SITES

**Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2004)**

<u>Area/Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Ames	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	29	80
Argonne-East	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	25	73
Brookhaven	6	6	6	100	0	100	100	40	90
Fermi	2	2	2	100	0	100	50	36	96
Oak Ridge (SC)	1	1	1	100	0	100	0	50	60
Pacific Northwest	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	44	80
Princeton	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	49	73
<b>SC Site Totals</b>	18	18	18	<b>100</b>	0	100	<b>89</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	-	-	-	<b>100</b>	-	-	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

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\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

**SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:**

- At Argonne, an ASO-E FR identified a Class IIIb laser operation that did not have an appropriate standard operating procedure and permit. The ANL-E Laser Safety Officer confirmed that the operation was not authorized and the laser was subsequently locked out until approved.
- At Brookhaven, all FRs continue to participate in developing and implementing the BNL Safety Improvement Initiative and BHSO Comprehensive Safety Strategy. The initiative and strategy stems from recent increases in injuries and near misses. Parts of the initiative and strategy include improvements to the BNL Standards Based Management System (SBMS), Corrective Action Management, BNL Self Assessment, ISM, and Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS) 18001. A major emphasis is improving BNL work planning and defining and bounding skill of the craft.
- At Fermi, FR activities continue to focus attention on the safety posture of construction subcontractors and the DOE external regulation initiative.

## OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2004)

<u>Area/Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTE Level</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
Argonne-West	3	3	3	100	0	100	100	33	67
Idaho (NE)	7	6	6	86	0	100	100	40	81
Oak Ridge (NE)	5	5	4	80	0	100	50	36	43
<b>NE Totals</b>	15	14	13	<b>87</b>	0	100	<b>85</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	-	-	-	<b>100</b>	-	-	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;60</b>

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\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

### NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Argonne-West, an FR identified a weakness in the conduct of an emergency drill. Certain personnel were allowed to be exempted from the drill after the drill commenced. The FR noted that the identification of such exempted personnel should be made prior to the beginning of the drill. Also, the Database for Improvement Opportunity Tracking was improved based on an FR concern that a corrective action was signed off as being complete without the proposed system modification work being performed.
- At Idaho, the FR data is now reported in two groups, ID (EM) and ID (NE). ID (EM) is in the Environmental Management section.
- Also at Idaho, an FR at the TRA performed a post maintenance review of a Work Order associated with associated with replacement of a Regulating Rod Position Synchro at the Advanced Test Reactor and identified that incorrect torque specification had been applied. The Work Order had been reviewed and approved by five contractor organizations, engineering, maintenance, quality assurance, nuclear assessment group, and operations, and none had identified the incorrect torque specification problem. It was later determined that the incorrect component had been identified on the drawing as the reference for obtaining torque specifications for the maintenance activity.