




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# Why Can't We All Just Get Along?

## Lessons In Reconciling Cost Estimates

presented by:

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# Affidavit of Prejudice

**The presenter is a veterans  
of many Independent Cost  
Estimates (ICEs) and few  
Program Office Estimates  
(POEs)...**

**by choice!**



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- **Definitions of “Reconcile”**
- **When and Why Do We Reconcile Cost Estimates?**
- **A Brief History of Cost Reconciliation**
- **Why We Should Expect Problems**
- **What Are the Problems?**
- **What Can We Do About It?**
- **Tips for Presenting the Outcome of a Reconciliation**
- **Summary**
- **Why Can’t We All Just Get Along?**



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# Definitions of “Reconcile”

- 1 a : to restore to friendship or harmony
- 1 b : settle, resolve
- 2 : to make consistent or congruous
- 3 : to cause to submit to or accept something unpleasant <was reconciled to hardship>
- 4 a : to check (a financial account) against another for accuracy
- 4 b : to account for

Source: Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 10th Edition

*Reconciliation of cost estimates can involve all of the above,  
but the primary objective is #4!*

# When and Why Do We Reconcile Cost Estimates?

- **When? Reconciliation occurs:**
  - When there are multiple program estimates from different sources—POEs, ICEs
  - When changes in technical and programmatic inputs result in changed estimates
  - When the sponsor demands it
- **Why? Reconciliation enables decision makers to take advantage of all available information in deciding**
  - Whether or not to fund a project
  - How many resources to budget for the project



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# A Brief History of Cost Reconciliation: In The Beginning...

- **There was only one project estimate...**
  - Generated by managing engineers, sometimes with the help of those who would do the work
  - Examples: John Roebling & Brooklyn Bridge, Steve Bechtel & Hoover Dam
- **The results were *useful*:**
  - Provided a basis for obtaining financing (and for financiers to assign blame as costs rose)
  - Provided a basis for managing to budget



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# A Brief History of Cost Reconciliation: In The Beginning...

- **But the first project cost estimates were *not perfect*:**
  - Only as valid and reliable as the estimators' experience and knowledge
  - Frequently incomplete, not comprehensive
  - Inconsistent across projects
  - Often biased toward securing funding



# A Brief History of Cost Reconciliation: Later On...

- Seeing this, the bill payers said,

*Let the project office create a “formal” estimate.*

- “Formal” = based on procedures, more experts
- And the results were *better*:
  - More documentation for the financiers & oversight groups
  - More comprehensive estimate
  - Easier to identify biases, missing costs
- But *still not perfect*:
  - Still success driven (still biased)
  - Always precisely wrong at the end
  - Sometimes way wrong early on

# A Brief History of Cost Reconciliation: Still Later...

- So the bill payers said,

*Let there be a second, independently generated estimate.*

- “Independent” = “unbiased”\*
- And the results were *more*
- But *not always better*: What happens when the two estimates disagree?

\* In fact, a different set of biases

# A Brief History of Cost Reconciliation: Today

- And finally the bill payers said,

*Let the two estimates be reconciled.*

- And the results were *better still*:
  - Arithmetic errors are identified and fixed
  - Sometimes the totals of the two estimates equal each other (within some error bounds)
- Except for *two small problems*:
  - Element estimates below the top line typically disagree, sometimes substantially
  - Neither estimate is ever exactly right

- **Reconciliation is not “target practice”**
- **Goal is not replication**
- **Estimators may need to agree to disagree about such matters as:**
  - **Ground rules**
  - **Assumptions**
  - **What constitutes a valid basis for estimating**
  - **Risks**

# Why We Should Expect Problems (Philosophical)

- **Cost estimation deals with forecasting, not foretelling**
  - Hence, any cost estimate is always exactly wrong
- **A cost estimate is not “real;” you cannot observe an estimated cost in the real world**
- **The cost estimator/analyst must build an estimate from the engineers’ model of a yet unrealized program**
- **In other words, every cost estimate is a (*model, estimate, incomplete characterization, copy*) of a (*model, estimate, incomplete characterization, copy*) which is reminiscent of....**

# Why We Should Expect Problems (Theoretical)

“‘Four’ is cloned from ‘Two’, and has the mentality of an overly-curious child. Unfortunately since he is a clone-of-a-clone, his IQ is considerably lower than that of his predecessors, since the personality defects are more pronounced when a clone is cloned (The analogy from the movie refers to how a copy of a copy may not be as 'sharp' as the original).” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiplicity\\_\(film\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiplicity_(film))



# Why We Should Expect Problems (Practical)

- **Actors have different perceptions**
- **Motives vary sometimes even over the course of the reconciliation effort**
  - Political pressure builds
  - Expected outcome replaced by feared one
- **Stakeholders have conflicting & changing expectations about process & outcome:**
  - No collusion!
  - How can we use the best of the information to come up with a single number to which we can budget?

# What Are the Problems?

An undefined problem has an infinite number of solutions.

--Robert A. Humphrey



# Here Are A Few

- **Different Motives**
- **Different Methodologies**
- **Time Lag**
- **Lingering Vagueness**
- **Different Ground Rules and Assumptions**



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# Different Motives

- **The POE generally reflects a success-oriented outlook and a plan the way the program office wants it to be. It may**
  - Be in a buy-in mode
  - Uncritically accept contractor claims
  - Ignore history
- **The ICE generally**
  - Tries to account for the worst that can happen
  - Comes from a nonadvocate, honest broker perspective and reflects lessons of multiple historical programs
  - May be required to ensure adequate funding to cover risks
  - May be perceived or actually intended to kill a program.

*“Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?”...Chico Marx*

- **POE**
  - Parametric models calibrated to a particular environment
  - Engineering judgment
  - Contractor data and estimates
  - Vendor quotes
  - Bottom up
  - Extrapolation from actuals
- **ICE**
  - Parametric models that produce estimates based on industry averages (Type III)
  - Historical data / Analogy (Type IV)
  - Industry trends (Type III and Type IV)



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# Time Lag

- **ICE relies on compiled information representing a snapshot of the program at a given time**
  - **Technical Description (CARDS, Technical Specifications) documentation updated infrequently**
  - **Access to functional specialists limited**
- **POE benefits from close and continuous contact with engineers and program management and thus may lead the ICE by several months**
- **Each may be an estimate of a different program!**



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# Lingering Vagueness

- **Requirements still volatile**
  - Designs immature
  - Quantities undecided
  - Manufacturing readiness uncertain
  - Hosted Programs in flux
- **Potential players not all identified (both sponsors and contractors)**
- **Schedule**
  - Actual need date
  - Availability of essential technology
- **Program office and ICE team may simply end up with different views**

- **Perceptions of Uncertainty and Risk**
  - **Size growth**
  - **Code growth**
  - **GFE**
  - **COTS**
  - **Heritage of hardware**
  - **Reliance on other programs**
- **Headcounts**
- **Inflation rates**

# What Can We Do About It?

There is no human problem which could not be solved if people would simply do as I advise.

--Gore Vidal

# Sanity Checks

- Let history into the discussion
- Better, faster, cheaper: you can't get all three... and are lucky to get just one
- The contractor community is not Lake Wobegon: they are not all above average\*
- New ways of doing business generally aren't

\*Neither are program offices

*“In an insane world, a sane man looks insane.”  
--Ray Covert*






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# Space Vehicle Comparisons: Cost per kilogram (FY06\$)

DDT&E and First Unit for Space Vehicle Including Payload



# Agree to Disagree

- **Since the only certainty is that neither POE nor ICE will be correct, humility on both sides is appropriate**
- **Choice of methodology is usually a matter of opinion**
  - **Can expect different results**
  - **Each will have a different error associated with the estimate**
- **Future trends of inflation, cost, technology, etc. are open to differing viewpoints**
- **Should NOT agree to disagree to avoid doing diligence, for example.....**



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# When Not to Agree to Disagree

*“Your insistence does not relieve our requirement for due diligence.”* *--Ray Covert*

- **Handling of program level item (system engineering, program management, integration and test)**
- **Objectively verifiable information (AKA facts)**
  - **Scope of existing hardware / infrastructure**
  - **Size of existing software**
  - **Code reuse potential**
  - **Demonstrated performance**
  - **Technology Readiness Level (TRL) (there is a rigorous calculator that should be used)**
- **Computational and algorithmic errors**
  - **“You are entitled to your own opinion but not to your own mathematics” .....NDH**

# Tips for Presenting the Outcome of a Reconciliation

The only thing to do with good advice is  
pass it on. It is never any use to oneself.

-- Oscar Wilde

# Highlight Differences in Ground Rules and Assumptions

- **ICE**

- Uncertainty is applied to all WBS elements
- Estimates are presented in FY06\$ through G&A but without fee
- DOE Inflation factors are used to escalate cost
- O&S estimated through 2030
- Pessimistic assessment of potential code growth is a factor of 2.5
- Most likely estimate of software assumes 20% code reuse
- Most likely schedule estimate includes 6 month delay in delivery of Hemiflexer from The Twinkler program
- COTS hardware and software will be upgraded every 3 years

- **POE**

- Uncertainty is applied to all WBS elements except the primary mission elements
- Estimates are presented in FY03\$ with fee
- Contractor inflation factors are used to escalate cost
- O&S estimated through 2025
- Pessimistic assessment of potential code growth is a factor of 1.5
- Most likely estimate of software assumes 90% code reuse
- Hemiflexer will be delivered from The Twinkler program 3 months before launch
- COTS hardware and software will be updated every 5 years



# Compare Methodologies By WBS Elements at a Suitable Level

| Level 2 Elements                        | ICE  | POE   |
|---|--|---|
| 1.0 Program Management                  | Factor   | Staffing by analogy   |
| 2.0 Systems Engineering                 | Factor   | Staffing by analogy   |
| 3.0 Safety and Mission Assurance        | Factor   | Staffing by analogy   |
| 4.0 Science/Technology                  | Space Operations Cost Model (SOCM)   | Staffing by analogy   |
| 5.0 Payload                             | NASA Instrument Cost Model   | Extrapolation from Actuals  |
| 6.0 Spacecraft                          | Hardware: Top-level models such as AMCM and QuickCost; Analogy; Dollars per kg comparison; Software: Lines of code per staff month comparisons, Aerospace CERs | Hardware: NAFCOM or other subsystem level parametric models; Software: COCOMO II Early Design version |
| 7.0 Mission Operations                  | SOCM; Software: COCOMO II Early Design version   | Staffing by analogy   |
| 8.0 Launch Vehicle/Services             | Look up tables, historical data adjusted as necessary  | NASA Pricing Quotations   |
| 9.0 Ground Systems Development          | Hardware: Ground Station Rules of Thumb; Software: COCOMO II Early Design version, Aerospace CERs  | Hardware: Vendor Quotes; Software: Lines of code per staff month comparisons                          |
| 10.0 System Integration Assembly & Test | Factor   | Staffing by analogy   |
| 11.0 Education & Public Outreach        | Factor   | Analogy   |



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# Compare Estimates




| Statistic                    | ICE           | POE           |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| <b>Trials</b>                | 10,000        | 10,000        |
| <b>Mean</b>                  | 6052          | 5219          |
| <b>Median</b>                | 5984          | 5212          |
| <b>Standard Deviation</b>    | <b>806</b>    | <b>270</b>    |
| <b>Variance</b>              | 649915        | 72884         |
| <b>Skewness</b>              | <b>0.5213</b> | <b>0.1518</b> |
| <b>Kurtosis</b>              | 3.42          | 3             |
| <b>Coeff. of Variability</b> | <b>0.1332</b> | <b>0.0517</b> |
| <b>Minimum</b>               | 3934          | 4329          |
| <b>Maximum</b>               | 10509         | 6285          |

| Percentile | ICE   | POE   |
|------------|-------|-------|
| <b>10%</b> | 5,073 | 4,878 |
| <b>20%</b> | 5,359 | 4,990 |
| <b>30%</b> | 5,583 | 5,072 |
| <b>40%</b> | 5,780 | 5,144 |
| <b>50%</b> | 5,984 | 5,212 |
| <b>60%</b> | 6,187 | 5,281 |
| <b>70%</b> | 6,429 | 5,355 |
| <b>80%</b> | 6,705 | 5,444 |
| <b>90%</b> | 7,129 | 5,569 |



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# Compare Distributions



- **ICE entirely overlaps POE**
  - POE mean (5,211) falls below the ICE 20th percentile
  - All scenarios in POE are in ICE
  - POE significantly understates the risk of total program cost overruns



# Compare Estimates at an Appropriate WBS Level

| WBS                         | WBS                                     | POE          |              |              |           | ICE          |              |              |            | Delta (ICE-POE) | % Difference (ICE-POE)/ICE |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|----------------------------|
|                             |   | Mean         | 50th         | 80th         | 80/50     | Mean         | 50th         | 80th         | 80/50      | Means           | Means                      |
|                             | <b>Total</b>                            | <b>2,606</b> | <b>2,606</b> | <b>2,722</b> | <b>4%</b> | <b>3,030</b> | <b>2,989</b> | <b>3,377</b> | <b>12%</b> | <b>424</b>      | <b>14%</b>                 |
| 1.1                         | System Level Segment                    | 214          | n/a          | n/a          |           | 460          | 446          | 531          | 16%        | 247             | 54%                        |
| 1.2                         | Space Segment                           | 781          | n/a          | n/a          |           | 933          | 904          | 1,099        | 18%        | 151             | 16%                        |
| 1.2.1                       | Space Segment SE/PM                     | 140          |              | 155          |           | 67           | 58           | 91           | 36%        | (73)            | -109%                      |
| 1.2.2                       | Space Segment AI&T                      | 60           | -            | 66           |           | 50           | 44           | 68           | 36%        | (10)            | -20%                       |
| 1.2.3                       | Payload 1                               | 172          | 168          | 198          | 15%       | 244          | 225          | 302          | 25%        | 73              | 30%                        |
| 1.2.4                       | Payload 2                               | 32           | 32           | 32           | 0%        | 32           | 32           | 32           | 0%         | (0)             | 0%                         |
| 1.2.5                       | Payload 3                               | 36           | 36           | 40           | 9%        | 103          | 93           | 134          | 31%        | 67              | 65%                        |
| 1.2.6                       | Payload 4                               | 100          | 98           | 114          | 14%       | 129          | 120          | 163          | 26%        | 28              | 22%                        |
| 1.2.7                       | Payload 5                               | 31           | 31           | 35           | 11%       | 31           | 29           | 39           | 27%        | 0               | 0%                         |
| 1.2.8                       | Spacecraft/Bus (including AGE and LOOS) | 209          | 207          | 243          | 14%       | 278          | 268          | 329          | 19%        | 68              | 25%                        |
| 1.3                         | Ground Segment                          | 150          | 149          | 163          | 9%        | 244          | 239          | 272          | 12%        | 94              | 39%                        |
| 1.3.1                       | Ground Segment SE/PM                    | 23           | 23           | 25           | 9%        | 49           | 45           | 63           | 29%        | 26              | 52%                        |
| 1.3.2                       | Ground Segment AI&T                     | 4            | 3            | 4            | 9%        | 33           | 30           | 42           | 29%        | 29              | 89%                        |
| 1.3.3                       | Ground Sites                            | 114          | 113          | 125          | 10%       | 137          | 135          | 149          | 9%         | 22              | 16%                        |
| 1.3.4                       | Terrestrial Communication               | 0            | 0            | 0            | 14%       | 5            | 5            | 6            | 15%        | 5               | 94%                        |
| 1.3.5                       | Training, Simulators and Spares         | 8            | 8            | 10           | 16%       | 21           | 20           | 25           | 20%        | 12              | 60%                        |
| 1.4                         | Off Contract Effort                     | 86           | 85           | 95           | 10%       | 131          | 128          | 153          | 16%        | 46              | 35%                        |
| 1.5                         | Software Segment                        | 303          | 299          | 360          | 17%       | 335          | 295          | 496          | 41%        | 32              | 10%                        |
| 1.6                         | Launch Segment                          | 201          | 198          | 228          | 13%       | 225          | 221          | 259          | 14%        | 25              | 11%                        |
| 1.7                         | Operations & Support Segment            | 322          | 321          | 346          | 7%        | 372          | 367          | 417          | 12%        | 51              | 14%                        |
| 1.8                         | Government Costs                        | 500          | 497          | 538          | 8%        | 329          | 324          | 371          | 13%        | (171)           | -52%                       |
| <b>Combined 1.1 and 1.8</b> |   | <b>714</b>   |              |              |           | <b>790</b>   |              |              |            | <b>76</b>       | <b>10%</b>                 |

**Need to be prepared to explain each major discrepancy!**



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# List Unresolved Issues

| <b>Issue</b>   | <b>WBS Element(s)<br/>Affected</b> |
|--|------------------------------------|
| <b>Reliable TRLs for high-cost items unavailable in time for the ICE</b>       | 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.7  |
| <b>Math error in POE suspected</b>   | 1.2.8                              |
| <b>Code count used in ICE lower than the one used for the POE</b>              | 1.5                                |
| <b>About 40% of the POE comes from contractors with unproven track records</b> | 1.2                                |
| <b>ICE disregards significant heritage of platform</b>                         | 1.2.8                              |

# Summary

- **Any cost estimate is a prediction and predictions are always precisely wrong!**
- **There are any number of reasons why cost estimates differ**
- **Recognize that reconciliation means identifying the valid reasons for the differences, not unnaturally forcing two estimates closer to each other**
- **Use relevant history as a source of sanity checks**
- **The POE represents more of a policy as to how much management is willing to pay and what the head count will be**
- **The ICE is more likely to represent how much the program actually could cost**

# Why Can't We All Just Get Along?

**Because we're really not  
supposed to!**

Reconciliation should be accompanied by justice, otherwise it will not last. While we all hope for peace it shouldn't be peace at any cost but peace based on principle, on justice.

--Corazon Aquino



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# Acronyms

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| AKA     | Also Known As                                 |
| AI&T    | Assembly, Integration and Test                |
| AMCM    | Advanced Mission Cost Model                   |
| B       | billion                                       |
| CARD    | Cost Analysis Requirement Description         |
| CER     | Cost Estimating Relationship                  |
| COCOMO  | Constructive Cost Model                       |
| COTS    | Commercial Off the Shelf                      |
| Dem/Val | Demonstration/Validation                      |
| DDT&E   | Design, Development, Test and Evaluation      |
| DoD     | Department of Defense                         |
| ESLOC   | Executable Source Lines of Code               |
| FY      | Fiscal Year                                   |
| GFE     | Government Furnished Equipment                |
| ICE     | Independent Cost Estimate                     |
| K       | thousand                                      |
| kg      | kilogram                                      |
| M       | million                                       |
| NASA    | National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
| NDH     | Neal David Hulkower                           |
| NICM    | NASA Instrument Cost Model                    |
| NRE     | Nonrecurring Engineering                      |
| O&S     | Operations and Support                        |
| POE     | Program Office Estimate                       |
| ROM     | Rough Order of Magnitude                      |
| SEE     | Standard Error of Estimate                    |
| SM      | Staff months                                  |
| SOCM    | Space Operation Cost Model                    |
| TRL     | Technology Readiness Level                    |
| WBS     | Work Breakdown Structure                      |