



U.S. Department of Energy  
Office of Inspector General  
Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries

# Inspection Report

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Review of the Department of Energy's  
Canine Program at Selected Sites

DOE/IG-0755

January 2007



## Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

January 23, 2007

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM:

*Greg Friedman*  
Gregory H. Friedman  
Inspector General

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Review of the Department of Energy's Canine Program at Selected Sites"

### BACKGROUND

An essential element of the Department of Energy's (Department) efforts to identify and deter potential threats to its facilities and personnel is the Department's Canine Program. Depending on specific mission needs, site canine teams are trained and certified in explosives detection and/or suspect apprehension and search techniques. Canine teams assigned to certain Department sites also support Federal and local law enforcement activities, such as searching areas for explosives prior to high-level dignitary visits and clearing schools after bomb threats.

The Department contracts for its canine teams. Canine teams undergo periodic assessment to ensure the reliability of their apprehension and explosives detection skills. Odor Recognition Proficiency Tests (ORPT) and operational evaluations are used to evaluate the canines' explosives detection effectiveness. An ORPT assesses canine recognition of explosives' odors; an operational evaluation assesses the canine and its handler as a team and their ability to perform in an environment that most closely reflects their day-to-day areas of security responsibilities. Canines must pass both of these assessments to be considered effective.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed the Canine Programs at three Department sites to determine whether they provided an adequate level of protection for personnel and facilities. Because of potential security vulnerabilities, the sites involved are not identified in this report. The same contractor was responsible for the Canine Programs at all three sites. At each site, we observed assessments of the canine teams conducted by the contractor. The Department did not have assessment standards, so we used standards established by the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the U.S. Police Canine Association (USPCA), as well as the contractor's standards. The scope of our inspection did not include an assessment of the appropriateness of using DOE's Canines at locations other than DOE sites.

### RESULTS OF INSPECTION

We concluded that, for the three sites we reviewed, the Canine Programs did not provide an adequate level of protection for Department personnel and facilities. Specifically, we found that:

- Half of the canine teams we observed failed the explosive detection portion of the operational evaluation;



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- Each of the canines we observed in suspect apprehension demonstrations failed to respond to at least one of the handler's commands; and,
- The canines were not receiving the minimum number of hours of weekly training for explosives detection that were specified in the contractor's standards.

We made recommendations to the relevant program offices, Fossil Energy (FE), and Health, Safety and Security (HS) to address these issues and enhance security. While our inspection identified concerns at three specific Department sites, we recommended that HS review the Canine Programs at all Department sites to ensure they provide an adequate level of protection for Department personnel and facilities.

#### MANAGEMENT REACTION

Management's comments and planned actions were responsive to our recommendations. Once completed, these corrective actions should help improve the effectiveness of the Department's Canine Program. In its amended response, FE concurred with the recommendation regarding discrepancies in the Canine Program and its impact on providing an adequate level of protection. As part of its corrective action plan, FE charged responsible contractor officials with improving detection and response training, qualification, and certification of all canine teams.

HS also concurred with the three recommendations addressed to that office and initiated action to benchmark the Department's Canine Program with other Federal agencies and to develop Department-wide policy. HS stated that the evaluation methodology used by its contractor conformed to that of the USPCA and that the OIG had limited the canine teams to only one opportunity to detect odors, contrary to the USPCA criteria. Thus, HS asserted that USPCA allowed two opportunities to detect odors. However, we confirmed that USPCA policy allows only one opportunity to detect odors. Further, we contacted the USPCA National Executive Director, who stated that canine teams are, in fact, only given one chance to locate the odor. HS also stated that during the inspection, numerous individuals not associated with the evaluation were in the immediate presence of the canine team which distracted the team from its search. However, during our testing, the contractor controlled the environment, and at no time during the testing did the contractor state that our presence could negatively affect the test results. Further, we note that during an actual incident or event, a canine team would not function in a sterile environment.

Management's comments can be found in Appendix B of this report; however, information that identified the sites or the contractor has been redacted in order to make this report publicly available.

Attachment

cc: Deputy Secretary  
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration  
Under Secretary of Energy  
Under Secretary of Science  
Chief of Staff  
Assistant Secretary, Office of Fossil Energy  
Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer  
Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management (NA-66)  
Director, Office of Internal Review (CF-1.2)

# REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S CANINE PROGRAM AT SELECTED SITES

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# Overview

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## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an inspection of the Canine Program at selected sites within the Department of Energy (Department). In the current threat environment, where explosives are a terrorist's weapon of choice, the Department's Canine Program is an essential component in the effort to identify and deter potential threats to facilities and personnel.

The Department's Canine Program includes Dual Purpose and Single Purpose Canine Teams. Each team consists of a handler and a canine. The Dual Purpose Canine Teams are used for explosives detection, as well as patrol duties, such as suspect apprehension and searches. The Single Purpose Canine Teams are used solely for explosives detection. Depending on specific mission needs at a site, the canine teams are trained and certified in explosives detection, and/or suspect apprehension and search techniques. Some canine teams assigned to certain Department sites also support local and Federal law enforcement activities. For example, canine teams at one site we visited were used recently to clear local schools after bomb threats were received and for explosives detection prior to a high-level visit by a dignitary.

The objective of our inspection was to determine whether the Department's Canine Program provides an adequate level of protection for Department personnel and facilities. The Department does not have a Department-wide policy regarding the Canine Program. Therefore, we used the criteria developed by each Department site as the basis for our review at that site. At our request, the contractor at each of the three sites we visited provided a demonstration and operational test involving the canine teams. At two of the sites, Dual Purpose Canine Teams demonstrated their abilities in suspect apprehension and search techniques, and, in explosives detection. At the third site, Single Purpose Canine Teams demonstrated their abilities in explosives detection.

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**OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**

We determined that, at the sites we visited, the Department's Canine Program does not provide an adequate level of protection for Department personnel and facilities. Specifically, we found that:

- Half of the canine teams we observed failed the explosive detection portion of the operational evaluation.
- Each of the canines we observed in the suspect apprehension demonstrations failed to respond to at least one of the handler's commands.
- The canines were not receiving the minimum hours of weekly training required for explosives detection.

## Details of Findings

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### **BACKGROUND**

The same contractor managed the canine programs at the three sites we visited. Canines undergo periodic testing to ensure the reliability of their detection and apprehension skills. A two-part process is used by the contractor to evaluate the canines' detection effectiveness: Odor Recognition Proficiency Test (ORPT) and operational evaluations. According to the contractor's own criteria, canines must successfully perform both evaluations to be considered effective.

The ORPT is used at each site to test the canines' odor recognition capabilities for ten explosives, including dynamite, C-4, and black powder. The ORPT is based on a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) standard, since ATF is recognized by Congress as a benchmark for effective canine explosives detection. Both the ATF standard and the contractor's test require the canines to successfully locate all ten explosive odors. According to the ATF standard and the contractor's own criteria, the canine must receive a failing score if the canine fails to respond to any one of the ten explosive odors used in the test. Six of the ten explosive odors are mandated by the standards, while the remaining four explosive odors are elective. The ORPT allows the canine team two opportunities to recognize an odor.

The second explosive detection evaluation involves the operational testing of the canine teams. This test is intended to evaluate the canine and handler as a team and their ability to perform in an environment that most closely reflects their day-to-day areas of security responsibilities. In contrast to the ORPT, the U.S. Police Canine Association (USPCA) standards allow the canine team only one opportunity to locate the explosive aid. We observed this latter testing during our inspection.

### **EXPLOSIVES DETECTION**

Of the eight canine teams we observed at the three Department sites, four canines failed to detect one or more explosive odors used in the operational demonstration. In addition, we obtained information from the contractor which indicated that during their recent annual certification, four canines failed in their first attempt to detect explosive odors required by the contractor's ORPT. Contractor officials told us that the four canine teams that failed the operational explosive detection demonstrations that we observed would be scheduled for remedial training.

The contractor's manual at two of the Department sites requires that each canine receive a minimum of four hours of

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explosive detection training weekly. We reviewed the training records at those two sites and determined that during a recent five-month period, the average weekly explosives detection training for the canines ranged from 1 ½ hours to 3 ¾ hours. Further, we were told that four of the eight canine teams rarely trained on four of the six mandatory explosive odors required by the ATF and contractor standards.

In our view, the failure of half the canines we observed to detect one or more explosive odors in a demonstration conducted by the contractor raises serious concerns about the ability of the Department's Canine Program to adequately protect the Department's sites and personnel.

## **SUSPECT APPREHENSION**

At two Department sites, we observed suspect apprehension demonstrations involving four canine teams. Each of the canines we observed in the suspect apprehension demonstrations failed to respond to at least one of the handler's commands during the demonstrations. During the demonstrations, we observed instances where the simulated adversary (decoy) complied with the handlers' instruction to stop, yet the canine bit the decoy without being commanded by the handler to do so, and failed to return to the handler upon command. We also observed that some of the canines failed to release the decoy at the handlers' command and, in some cases, had to be choked by the handlers to release the decoy.

## **VULNERABILITIES**

The results of our review to date confirm that canine performance at the sites included in our review did not meet expectations. This created, in our judgment, an unacceptable vulnerability for the security and safety of Departmental operations. Because of the sensitivity of this matter, the sites involved have not been identified in this report, but instead, the site locations have been communicated to management. This report is directed to senior management responsible for the facilities involved. Because of the importance of the Canine Program as part of the Department's overall security effort, we have included a number of recommendations for corrective action.



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**RECOMMENDATIONS**

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy:

1. Take immediate action to ensure the Canine Program at [specified sites] provides an adequate level of protection for Department personnel and facilities in accordance with applicable Federal standards.

We also recommend that the Chief, Office of Health, Safety and Security:

2. Take immediate action to ensure the Canine Program at [specified site] provides an adequate level of protection for Department personnel and facilities in accordance with applicable Federal standards.
3. Review the Canine Programs at Department sites across the complex to ensure they provide an adequate level of protection for Department personnel and facilities.
4. Develop policies and procedures for the Department Canine Program to establish minimum training and testing requirements for canine teams at Department facilities.

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**MANAGEMENT  
COMMENTS**

In comments on a draft of this report, the Office of Fossil Energy (FE) and the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HS) concurred with the recommendations and agreed to take corrective action. During the management response process, FE was given the opportunity to revise its initial response. As part of its corrective action plan, FE charged responsible contractor officials with improving detection and response training, qualification, and certification of all its canine teams. In comments regarding its security program, FE emphasized that the "...canine program constitutes one element of a multi-layered security program that, as a whole, meets DOE requirements for an adequate level of protection for the safety and security of DOE personnel and facilities."

In its comments, HS indicated that action had been initiated to benchmark the Department's Canine Program with other Federal agencies and to develop Department-wide policy. HS also noted that the evaluation methodology used by its contractors conformed to that of the USPCA and that the OIG had limited the canine teams to only one opportunity to detect odors, contrary to the USPCA evaluation methodology. Finally, HS stated that numerous individuals in the immediate presence of the canine team distracted the team from its search. According to HS, these issues collectively may have biased the results of our inspection.

Management comments are included in Appendix B of this report.

**INSPECTOR  
COMMENTS**

Regarding FE's comments on its security program, we understand that sites employ other layers in their security program in addition to the canine teams. Although those other security layers were not part of this review, it is well established that the canine teams offer a unique capability. In April 2005, FE's Canine Program was also evaluated by a Department of Defense (DOD) canine expert. That report noted "...none of the eight teams were able to find all of the low explosive odors hidden on the vehicles or in the building. Five of the teams missed all of the explosive odors hidden in the scenarios." Furthermore, the report stated that only two canine teams would pass "...a DOD equivalent certification in patrol work." As with our report, the DOD report revealed that the canines' performance created an unacceptable vulnerability for the Department's operations.

Furthermore, FE's canine teams have been used to clear local schools after bomb threats, and for explosives detection prior to a

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high-level visit by a dignitary. In contrast to the FE sites, schools may not have sophisticated, multi-layered security systems and must rely exclusively on the canine team's ability to search for potential explosives. In today's threat environment, one failure by the Department canines to detect explosives at a school, a high-level dignitary visit, or Department site could have catastrophic consequences.

Regarding HS's comments about our testing methods, at our request, the contractor provided operational demonstrations of the Explosives Detection Teams. We relied on the contractor's own criteria, as well as established criteria by relevant Federal agencies to reach our conclusions on the canines' effectiveness. According to HS, because the OIG limited the canine teams to only one opportunity to detect odors during the demonstrations, we failed to follow the USPCA conforming evaluation methodology used by its contractor. However, according to USPCA criterion and the Director of the USPCA, the canine team is allowed only one chance to locate the aid during an operational evaluation. We reiterate that for operational evaluations, USPCA Certification Rules and Regulations require that a canine team be given only one chance to locate all the hidden explosive aids.

With respect to immediate re-testing of the dogs' failure to alert, the 2006-2007 USPCA Certification Rules and Regulations, General Rules and Definitions Governing Certifications of Detector Canines, states "Teams failing to successfully certify will not immediately be given a second chance. Multiple tests of the same team will not be conducted. The team has to undergo a period of retraining documenting successful performance before any attempt at re-certification." Furthermore, "Explosive certification requires a 100% find, all devices must be found."

We contacted the National Executive Director, USPCA, to obtain his expert opinion on the concerns expressed by HS regarding the testing methodology and interpretations that the OIG used in its evaluation of the canine teams. The Director stated that the USPCA requires a true 100% find and that the team is given only one chance to locate the aid. Furthermore, continual "Retesting until they locate all the aids is not done..." The Director explained that if the team fails to find all of the aids during the first attempt, the team must undergo a period of documented successful retraining. Then "...the teams can attempt re-certification but that attempt must be done on another day and the evaluation must be completed in its entirety." The Director added that the USPCA

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performance expectation requirement is extremely high due to the nature of the work performed by explosives detector dog teams.

HS also expressed concern that the presence of numerous individuals in the immediate presence of the canine team distracted the team from its search. The contractor controlled the environment during all the tests, and raised no objections, except during one instance when the contractor believed there were too many OIG observers and asked us to step back to watch the test. We complied with the contractor's request. At no time during any of the testing did the contractor state that our presence would nullify the test results. In addition to the operational demonstrations that were provided, we observed some of those same canine teams performing their official duties in areas where large numbers of individuals congregate and pass in close proximity to the canine teams. More importantly, during an actual event, or its immediate aftermath, the canine teams would not function in a sterile environment. Therefore, we disagree with management's assertion that the presence of additional individuals may distract the team from its search.

## Appendix A

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### **SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY**

The OIG initiated an inspection of the Canine Program at three Department sites. At each site, we observed demonstrations of the canines' abilities. We identified and reviewed applicable Federal and Department regulations. The OIG interviewed Department and contractor officials, and reviewed key documents applicable to the Canine Program.

Also, pursuant to the "Government Performance and Results Act of 1993," we reviewed site performance measurements processes related to the Canine Program.

This inspection was conducted in accordance with "Quality Standards for Inspections" issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

# Appendix B

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**Department of Energy**  
Washington, DC 20585

September 15, 2006

MEMORANDUM TO CHRISTOPHER SHARPLEY  
ACTING ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL  
OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND SPECIAL INQUIRIES  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: GLENN S. PODONSKY  
CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY OFFICER  
OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY

SUBJECT: COMMENTS FOR IG DRAFT LETTER REPORT – Review of  
DOE’s Canine Program at Selected DOE Sites (S06IS026)

The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) has reviewed the subject draft letter report provided by the Inspector General’s memorandum of August 24, 2006, and provides the following comments.

**Recommendation 2:** Take immediate action to ensure the Canine Program at [specified site] provides an adequate level of protection for DOE personnel and facilities in accordance with applicable Federal standards.


**Response:**

Concur

**Recommendation 3:** Review the Canine Programs at DOE sites across the complex to ensure they provide an adequate level of protection for DOE personnel and facilities.

**Response:**

Concur. The Office of Independent Oversight routinely evaluates the effectiveness of protective force canine programs in order to assess explosive detection capabilities and the readiness of the force to implement protection elements identified in each site’s safeguards and security plan. These inspections include a review of protective force training program documentation, interviews with protective force personnel (to include dog handlers, as applicable), and limited scope performance testing of protective force explosive detection/canine capabilities. These inspections also include evaluation of electronic explosive detection systems. Independent Oversight will continue to assess protective force canine programs and explosive detection equipment during future inspections at facilities where these protection elements are critical to the site’s protection



strategy or where a degradation of these capabilities would present a risk to DOE personnel or property.

**Recommendation 4:** Develop policies and procedures for the DOE Canine Program to establish minimum training and testing requirements for canine teams at DOE facilities.

**Response:**

Concur. The explosive detection and apprehension capabilities of canine assets can be an effective adjunct to a fully-integrated site safeguards and security program. The development of a Department-wide canine program policy has been initiated and will be based on existing and accepted Federal policies and procedures for the training, employment, health, welfare, and performance testing of working dogs. Discussions among canine, physical protection and protective force subject matter experts are ongoing relative to policy formulation and placement within the safeguards and security directives system in order to provide the complex with additional risk management tools.

In addition, the following comments regarding the conduct of the inspection are offered for consideration.

**Observation/Finding:** Of eight canine teams observed at three sites, four failed to detect one or more odors.

**Response:**

The evaluation methodology used by the HSS contractors conforms to the US Police Canine Association as well as other US Government agencies (i.e. Department of Defense). In that methodology, a canine is tested using various odors and if they fail to alert on any they are re-evaluated (area is re-presented to the team). If the canine does not alert a second time they are re-evaluated within twenty-four hours (this re-presentation of the area is in keeping with the standard canine methodology of having a team conduct an in-depth search versus a one time walk through). If the team does not successfully complete the test at that time they are then “de-certified” and immediately put into remedial training. The testing done by the Office of Inspector General did not use the accepted methodology. Additionally, during one inspection, numerous individuals not associated with the search (camera operators and others for a total of seven personnel) in the immediate presence of the team distracted the team from their search. Collectively, these issues may have biased the results of the testing.

**Observation/Recommendation:** The results of our review to date, confirm that canine performance at the sites included in our review, did not meet expectations. This created, in our judgment, an unacceptable vulnerability for the security and safety of Departmental operations.

**Response:**

Canine explosive detection teams are a relatively new component of an integrated security system designed to deter, detect and defend facilities and personnel from attack. Other recent improvements to this system include: increasing the number of Protective Force officers on patrol around the facility, upgrading surveillance and radio systems, and enhancing the capabilities of the Central Alarm Station. These measures make our facilities less attractive targets, improve our ability to detect an attack, and enhance our ability to take timely protective action. The canine teams are an integral component of this system in that they enhance both deterrence and detection. While your inspection has identified important areas for improvement, we believe that, the canine teams strengthen overall protection of our facilities.

Thank you for identifying weaknesses in the existing program and HSS will work to improve our policy, inspection capabilities, and the performance of our canine teams and their contribution to the protection of our facilities.

If you have any questions, you may contact me at (301) 903-3777, or Bill Dwyer at (202) 586-8075.

cc: Eric Burgeson, S-1  
Jeffrey Jarrett, FE-1  
John Newell, CF-1.2  
Michael Kilpatrick, HSS  
Lesley Gasperow, HSS  
Robert Ligan, HSS  
Richard Speidel, NA-66





Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

December 15, 2006

MEMORANDUM

TO: CHRISTOPHER R. SHARPLEY  
 ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR  
 INSPECTIONS AND SPECIAL INQUIRIES,  
 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: *for* JEFFREY D. JARRETT *Thomas D. Skyles*  
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY


SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DRAFT INSPECTION  
 REPORT ON "REVIEW OF DOE 'S CANINE PROGRAM AT  
 SELECTED DOE SITES" (S06IS026) AUGUST 2006

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on your office's August 24, 2006, draft letter report on the review of DOE's canine program at selected sites with its findings and recommendation to the Office of Fossil Energy.

We have attached documentation from the management and operating contractor, which represents our revised response and concurrence with the OIG draft report that discrepancies exist canine program. This supersedes a previous response submitted on September 14, 2006.

This attached documentation also serves as a corrective action plan that the and its management and operating contractor are proposing to address the report's findings and recommendation as a result of the review at These initiatives are designed to strengthen the oversight of the contractor's canine program to ensure that all objectives are achieved. Additionally, at the request of the DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security's Office of Independent Oversight will be reviewing canine program in January and February 2007; and, it is anticipated that this will assist with improving canine program, as well.

While agreeing with the draft report's cited discrepancies about canine program and committing to address them with appropriate corrective action, we still feel that it is important to reiterate, once again, our opinion that canine program constitutes



one element of a multi-layered security program that, as a whole, meets DOE requirements for an adequate level of protection for the safety and security of DOE personnel and facilities.

If your office should have any questions regarding our response, please contact Rick Hoffman, (202) 586-4401.

Attachments

cc: CF-1.2



Department of Energy

December 12, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR JEFFREY D. JARRETT  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FOSSIL ENERGY

THRU:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Response to the Inspector General Report "Review of DOE's Canine Program at Selected DOE Sites" (S06IS026) August, 2006

In providing the Office of Inspector General (OIG), with a response to the recommendation to the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy included in the Draft Letter Report's "Vulnerabilities and Recommendations" section, we provide the following comments. This supersedes our previous response dated September 14, 2006.

IG Recommendation: *"Take immediate action to ensure the Canine Program at [specified site] provides an adequate level of protection for Department of Energy (DOE) personnel and facilities in accordance with applicable Federal standards."*

Management Response: Concur. The agrees with the OIG that discrepancies exist in canine program. Although we have achieved excellent results since the genesis of the canine program we will strengthen our oversight of the contractor's canine program. are charged with improving detection and response training, qualification, and certification of canine teams. To ensure our objectives are achieved, the DOE Senior Site Representatives and the Security and Emergency Operations Division will target canine qualifications and certification during Security Surveys at each site. Moreover, Quality Assurance will be required to inspect and validate canine team training and certification programs at each site during Management Appraisals. Coupled with the Headquarters DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security, Office of Independent Oversight will review and validate the effectiveness canine program during their inspection in January and February 2007, at the request This letter corrective action plan to the OIG recommendations as a result of the canine review at the

JEFFREY D. JARRETT

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canine team is one element of our multi-layer security program, which includes access control, detection, and assessment systems as well as an armed response and mitigation from our protective force. We feel confident that our multi-layered protection program, which is based on Site Security Plan and the DOE Design Basis Threat, meets DOE requirements and provides an adequate level of protection for the safety and security of DOE personnel and facilities.

If there are any questions, please feel free to contact

Attachment

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