EA Operational Awareness Record	Report Number: EA-SRS-2016-04-19	
Site: Savannah River Site	Subject:	Conduct of Operations in Control Rooms
Dates of Activity: 04/19/16 - 04/20/16	Report Preparer: Jeff Snook	

Activity Description/Purpose:

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments, within the Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA), reviewed conduct of operations within three control rooms at the Savannah River Site. These control rooms were located at the H-Tank Farm, the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), and H-Canyon. The October 2015 Environmental Management (EM) combined conduct of operations assessment did not include a review of control room operations, so this review is EA's follow-up to that assessment.

ATTACHMENTS: None

Result: Although EA noted some areas for improvement, overall SRS control room operations were conducted professionally with a satisfactory level of conduct of operations formality. The control room operators answered communications by stating their name and station, responded to the callers appropriately, and addressed any issues. Control area supervisors adequately maintained control of their control rooms and personnel. In the H-Tank Farm, EA observed two good planning sessions for future work. The control area supervisor discussed future work, how the work would be coordinated and executed in the most effective manner, and how the control room operators would be involved in the activity. In the DWPF and H-Canyon control rooms, when alarms sounded, the control room operators formally called out, responded to, and appropriately addressed each alarm. At H-Canyon, an under-instruction watchstander was allowed to perform rounds and operate equipment, as needed, while still being appropriately supervised by a qualified control room operator.

EA identified some improvement areas. Manual 2S, Conduct of Operations, Control Area Activities, requires that each facility manager clearly defines the Control Areas (CA) and At-the-Controls (ATC) areas within the facility. The CA and ATC must be physically identified by visible means such as floor markings, signs, barrier ropes or chains. At H-Tank Farm, the ATC is not clearly identified by a visible marker. The Control Area Supervisor explained that two desktops coming to a pinch point represent the ATC, but entry is not prevented by a physical barrier or properly marked in accordance with Manual 2S. Additionally, of the two entrances to the control room, only one had a marking/barrier. The second entrance is a door from a hallway. EA observed personnel entering the control room without being granted permission. Also in accordance with Manual 2S, "Water and beverages are allowed in the CA, but do not place cups and containers upon or adjacent to consoles, panels, or other control system or computer keyboards. Liquids should not be consumed in ATC areas." In at least two of the control rooms, EA observed coffee and other beverages in ATC areas. If having beverages is necessary due to configuration of the control rooms or other reasons, compensatory measures such as using spill resistant containers would be expected and Manual 2S should then be modified appropriately. Also, although all alarms were acknowledged and addressed in all three control rooms, at times, some alarms were addressed informally (e.g., "Hey, what you got there?"). Manual 2S requires the, "Conduct of all CA activities in a disciplined, formal, businesslike, and professional manner. Keep the noise level in the CA at a minimum. Formality and professionalism in the conduct of shift operations is required. (Leaning on control consoles or panels and/or having one's back to the control board being monitored is not considered professional.)" EA experience has noted that conducting operations formally during routine operations is necessary at all times to ensure the operators are prepared when addressing emergency events that especially require CA formality.

EA also reviewed logs at DWPF and H-Canyon. Overall, operators appropriately maintained logs and made corrections with lineouts, initials, and dates. Some entries were difficult to read due to poor handwriting, but most were legible, explained the operation or alarm, and properly explained the events of each shift. One minor issue was identified with the use of unapproved acronyms and abbreviations. A large number of acronyms and abbreviations used in the logs are not on the facility- or site-approved acronym list. These unapproved acronyms included, but are not limited to, "ST2, RWT, OGCT, CAL, chems, inop, L/O, BBD, OOS, thermo" and many others. If acronyms specific to a facility would be helpful in the logs, the acronyms must be added to the approved acronym list.

EA Participants	References (Key Documents, Interviews, and Observations)	
EA Participants 1. Jeff Snook	 References (Key Documents, Interviews, and Observations) Interviewed 3 control area supervisors and 2 shift operations managers. F/H TANK FARMS AND ETP CONTROL AREA AND AT-THE-CONTROLS AREAS, Manual Ref. S4, Procedure OPS-S4-F/HTF,19, Rev. 4 Defense Waste Processing Facility approved acronyms list Department of Energy Savannah River Operations Office Acronym List w/Definitions 	
	 Conduct of Operations, Manual 2S, Procedure 5.3, Rev. 3 F/H TANK FARMS AND ETP CONTROL AREA AND AT-THE-CONTROLS AREAS, Procedure OPS-S4-F/HTF, 19, Rev. 4 DOE Order 422.1, Conduct of Operations, Chg. 2 	
EA Follow-Up Items	None	