

# A Regulator's Perspective on Interpretation of Performance and Risk Assessment Results

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Performance and Risk Assessment Community of Practice

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# Overview



1. Performance Assessment and Components
2. Compliance Metric and Examples
3. Uncertainty and Scenarios
4. Conservatism
5. Model Support

# Performance Assessment




Performance assessment is an analysis that:

- (1) Identifies the features, events, and processes that might affect the disposal system;
- (2) Examines the effects of these features, events, and processes on the performance of the disposal system; and
- (3) Estimates the annual dose to any member of the public caused by all significant features, events, and processes.


# Performance Assessment




**1** Real system




**2** Conceptual model





**3** Numerical model



**4** Estimated performance



**5** Model support



# Performance Assessment



Contractor/licensee  
Regulator  
Public stakeholder



- 1 Real system
- 2 Conceptual **model**
- 3 Numerical **model**
- 4 Estimated performance
- 5 **Model** support

How would different groups rank the importance of each component?

# Recent Incidents



Beatty



WIPP

# NRC Metric



- Demonstration of compliance with the performance objectives is based on a standard of reasonable assurance.
- Compliance review would consider quality of information, model support, and independent technical review.

# Common Points of Difference




- What is ‘reasonable assurance’?
- What is adequate justification or model support?
- How do alternate scenarios relate to what one party considers the “likely” scenario? Is there a “likely” scenario?

Each party is going to have a different viewpoint on these questions.







# Performance Assessment Results - Examples




# Performance Assessment Results - Examples



- Does either result demonstrate compliance with 61.41?
  - Both may or both may not

# Performance Assessment Results - Examples



Compliance  
period

- Doses increasing at end of compliance period
- Consider reasons for increase:
  - Geology
  - Geochemistry
  - Materials science

# Uncertainty and Alternative Cases


- Reviewers have numerous technical questions associated with a performance assessment.
- These questions are primarily about uncertainty in technical parameters and models used in the performance assessment.
- Uncertainties types include: data, model, scenario.
- Analysts have limited technical information to respond to the questions.
- Analysts evaluate alternative cases to show the impact of the uncertainties on the performance assessment results.

# Uncertainty and Alternative Cases – Example Questions



- Provide technical basis for the cement distribution coefficients ( $K_d$ 's).
- Provide technical basis for the assumed failure time of the cementitious wasteform (4,000 years).

# Uncertainty and Alternative Cases – Example Analyses




— Case D    — Case C    — Case B    — Case A

# Conservatism

- It is useful to evaluate unresolved technical issues with alternative cases.
- Cases should be thought of and presented in terms of amount or degrees of support.
- Cases should not be described as “conservative” or “reasonable” unless adequate support is provided.
- Conservatism can only be defined relative to what is known. Defining conservatism relative to what is believed is unreliable.

# Bias, Errors, and Pitfalls

- Modelers are not immune to the common biases, errors, and pitfalls associated with normal decision-making
- In fact modelers may be more susceptible than the average person





# Bias, Errors, and Pitfalls

- Correlation does not imply causation (calibration  $\neq$  validation)
- Sunk costs (keeping model clutter/unimportant features)
- Anchoring (rely on first pieces of information too heavily)
- Confirmation bias (demonstrate model is great)
- Framing (scope of the model is narrow)
- Blind spot bias (regulators are always trying to be conservative)
- Overconfidence (lack of emphasis on QA, ignoring tail risk)
- Data dredging (uncovering patterns without understanding)
- Ambiguity effect (include only things that you can reliably estimate probability)
- Risk aversion (very different for different parties)
- Kurtosis risk (everything is not normally distributed!)
- Butterfly effect (e.g. landform evolution modeling)

Twain “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.”

# Model Support - Principles




- Multiple lines of evidence preferred.
- Direct observations preferred.
- Level of model support based on risk significance.
- Longer experience ~ less support.
- Natural analogs for very long term performance.
- Support encompasses the full range of future conditions.

# Model Support

- At a minimum, should have elements of verification and validation:
  - Verification – Solving the equations correctly.
  - Validation – Solving the correct equations
- A variety of elements can be part of the model support process:
  - Internal review (QA)
  - Independent external review
  - Documentation of verification efforts
  - Multi-faceted validation effort: comparison to lab experiments, field experiments, analogs, etc.


# Example: Model Support for Engineered Barriers




Laboratory experiments  
Field experiments  
Observations – working systems  
Monitoring

Analogs  
Accelerated experiments  
Expert elicitation  
Comparison to other models

# Model Support - Past, Present, and Future Conditions



- The real world can be highly dynamic.
- Model support should be provided for the full range of expected future conditions.



# Conclusions

- Recent events should be a wake up call.
- If performance and risk assessments are considered to be robust models, they must have model support.
- Scenarios are useful, but should be used and interpreted cautiously.

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