



Cyber Securing Control Systems

August, 2015

Unclassified - Distribution Statement A



DoD Scope of Platform IT & Control Systems

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics


- **Acquisitions / Weapon Systems**

- H, M & E (ships / subs, missiles, UVs, etc.)
- Training Simulators, 3D printing, etc.



- **EI&E**

- Buildings & linear structures
- Airfields, piers, life-safety, AT/FP & physical security, utility/environmental monitoring and control, other infrastructure




- **Medical**

- Devices & equipment, pharmacy automation
- Imaging, CAT, MRI, etc.




- **Logistics**

- POLs, tank farms, pipelines, etc.
- Warehousing, materials handling
- Depots, refurbishment, plant mgmt.



- **Defense Industrial Base (DIB)**




**DoD IT & Cyber Strategies and Investments
Progressing to Incorporate PIT / CS**



Installation Example: CS Stakeholder Complexity


Acquisition, Technology and Logistics





Tactical Power – Networked?

Acquisition



- Reduce Fuel Consumption
- Increase Portability
- Increase Sustainability
- Integrate Power w/ Platform
- Relevant Renewables
- Improve Soldier Power

Energy Efficiency Benefit AND or VS. Cybersecurity?




What's in Your Building?

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

- *“Smart” / High Performance Green Buildings*
 - Since 2005 ~7,000+
 - Example: 5,000 desks, 15 floors, ~2M sqft
 - o In-service / occupancy in 2011



- **Fire Sprinkler System**
- **Interior Lighting Control**
- **Intrusion Detection**
- **Land Mobile Radios**
- **Renewable Energy Photo Voltaic Systems**
- **Shade Control System**
- **Smoke and Purge**
- **Physical Access Control**
- **Vertical Transport System (Elevators and Escalators)**
- **Advanced Metering Infrastructure**
- **Building Automation System**
- **Building Management Control**
- **CCTV Surveillance System**
- **CO2 Monitoring**
- **Digital Signage Systems**
- **Electronic Security System**
- **Emergency Management System**
- **Energy Management System**
- **Exterior Lighting Control Systems**
- **Fire Alarm System**



3 Networks Independently Managed



Existing Integration Systems

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Acuity Brands Roam Advantage Controls ALC Alerton AIE Alerton BACtalk
Alerton BCM-WEB American Auto-Matrix Auto Pilot American Auto-Matrix
Andover Controls Continuum Asi controls Auto Matrix Sage Automated Logic
WebCTRL Automated Logic Barber Coleman Network 8000 Bristol Babcock
CAPRON Carrier Carrier Comfort Network Carrier Com-Trol Control
Microsystems SCADAPack Cylon Unitron UC32 Daikin Data Aire Dell Vostro
Delta Controls ORCA Distech Echelon i.Lon Emerson-Liebert EXHAUSTO
Flygt ITT Industries APP 700 General Electric WESDAC General Electric
Honeywell Excel 5000 Honeywell WEBs-AX HSQ Technology Invensys I/A
Series Invensys Micronet Invensys Network 8000 Johnson Controls Facility
Explorer Johnson Controls Metasys Johnson Controls M-Series KMC LANDIS
Landis & Staefa Integral MS2000 Landis & Staefa Liebert SiteGate LOYTEC
Electronics L-VIS Lynxspring JENEsys Merlin Gerin PowerLogic Microwave
Data Systems Mitsubishi Motorola SCADA Systems Odessa Engineering
OmniaPRO Orion Controls Paragon EC7000 Series Racco Reliable Controls
MACH-ProWebSys Richards-Zeta Robert Shaw DMS RUGID Schneider
Electric I/A Series Schneider Electric PowerLogic Siebe Network 8000 Siemens
ACCESS Siemens Apogee Siemens Desigo PX Siemens Synco 700 Staefa
Staefa/Siemens STULZ Air Technologies TAC I/A Series TAC Network 8000
TAC Xenta TAC Vista Telvent Smart Grid Solution Trane Tracer Trane Tracer
Summit Trane Varitrac TREND Trend Control Systems IQ2 Tridium Vykon



Existing ICS Operating Software

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Desigo Insight KNX STANDARD ABB Symphony Plus OptimaxRev 4 ABB Symphony Plus 800xA SV 5.1 ABB Symphony Plus Composer 6.0 ABB Symphony Plus S+ Operations 1.1 Alerton BACTalk Envision 2.0 Alerton BACTalk Envision 2.6 Alerton VisualLogic Allen-Bradley RSLogix 500 Allen-Bradley RSLogix 500, RSView32 Automated Logic ExecB 6.0 Automated Logic SuperVision WebCTRL 5.5 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 3 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 3.0 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 5 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 5.2 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 4.1 SP1 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL Automated Logic ExecB 4.1 SP1 Automated Logic ExecB drv_lge_4-02-175 Automated Logic ExecB drv_melgr_vanilla_4-02-175 Automated Logic ExecB Automated Logic Supervision 2.6b Automated Logic WebCTRL 4 SP1B Automated Logic WebCTRL 4.1 SP1 Automated Logic WebCTRL 4.1 SP1b Automated Logic WebCTRL SVR 5.5 Calsense Command Center 4.15.11.20 Carrier Comfort Network Comfort Network 3.0 Control Microsystems ClearSCADA 2009 Ed. R2.2 Data flow Systems HyperTAC 2 Data flow Systems HyperTAC HT3 Delta Controls ORCA ORCAview 3.30 Delta Controls ORCA ORCAview 3.40 Delta Controls Orcaview 3.22 Delta Controls Orcaview 3.30 Delta Controls OrcaView 3.3 Delta Controls Orcaview 3.33 Delta Controls Orcaview Delta Controls, TAC ORCA, I/NET ORCAview, Seven Rel 2.15 EFACAC Prism ERI Siemens Insight 3.6 GE, Intellution Proficy, iFIX, FIX Desktop __, 4.0, _ General Electric Cimplicity Plant Edition 6.1 General Electric Multilin Config Pro 5.03 General Electric Proficy Cimplicity 7.0 General Electric Proficy iFIX 4.0 Honeywell Symmetre Station 3.5 Symmetre 3.5 Honeywell Webstation-AX Niagara Niagara 3.5.40.1 HSQ Miser 6.06 HSQ Miser HSQ, Sun Microsystems Miser, Xview 6.06 Iconics Genesis32 Genesis32 8.3 Iconics Genesis32 Genesis32 9.13 Iconics HMI SCADA Solutions Genesis 32 3.12.005 InduSoft Web Studio Intellution 7 Intellution FIX32 3.5 Intellution FIX32 Intellution iFIX 3.5 Intellution I/NET Intellution iFIX Reporter ITT Flygt AquaView AquaView 1.50 Johnson Controls Metasys 6.0.0.9000 Johnson Controls Metasys GX9100 7.05A Johnson Controls Metasys Metasys 5 Johnson Controls Metasys Metasys 5.1 Johnson Controls Metasys Project Builder 5:1 Johnson Controls Metasys Project Builder 3 Johnson Controls Metasys 5 Johnson Controls Metasys 12.04 Johnson Controls Metasys 2.0.0.70.0 Johnson Controls Metasys 5.2.0.5400 Johnson Controls Metasys Johnson Controls M-Graphics 5.3 Microsoft Explorer N/A N/A N/A N/A Pneu-Logic Pneu-Logic RACO RACO 3.14 Rainbird MAXICOM2 Central Control 4.3 ReLab Software ClearView-SCADA 7.2.8 Reliable Controls MACH ProWebSys RC-Studio 2.0 Robert Shaw Digital Management System Operator Interface 11.0 Rockwell FactoryTalk Service Platform 2.30 Rockwell FactoryTalk View, Rsview Site Edition, Supervisory 6.0, 6.0 Rockwell FactoryTalk 6.0 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Machine Edition 5.1 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Site Edition 4.0 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Site Edition 5.1 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Site Edition Rockwell Automation RSView Supervisory Edition 4.0 Rockwell Automation RSView Supervisory Edition Rockwell Automation RSView32 7.600.00 ScadaTEC SCADASIS 5.8.14.213 Schneider Electric PowerLogic ION Enterprise 5.6 Schneider Electric PowerLogic ION Enterprise Siebe Network 8000 Signal 4.4.1 Siemens S7 300 STEP 7 Siemens Apogee Insight Siemens Desigo Insight Siemens Insight Desigo Insight 2.31 Siemens Insight Desigo Insight 2.35.021 Siemens WinPM.Net 3.2 SP3 SUBNET Solutions SubSTATION Explorer 1.3.0 SUBNET Solutions SubSTATION Explorer 1.5.7 Sun Microsystems Xview 3.2 Symantec Backup Exec 2011? TAC I/A Series WorkPlace Tech 5.7 TAC I/A Series Workbench TAC I/A Series WorkPlace Tech 5.7.2 TAC 4.1 TAC Signal, XPSI & ZPSIPC Teletrol eBuilding Telvent OaSys DNA 7.4.* Trane Tracer SC Tracer 3.5 Trane Tracer Summit Tracer 11 Trane Tracer Summit Tracer 16 Trane Tracer Summit Tracer 17 Trane Tracer Summit V14 Tracer 14 Trane Tracer Summit V16 Tracer 16 Trane Tracer Summit V17 Tracer 17 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.428 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.430.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.431.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.514 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.514.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.522 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.522.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.522.v2 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.522V1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.527.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.529 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.532 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.532.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 3.3.31 Tridium Vykon Niagara 3.5.34 Tridium Vykon Niagara Workbench 3.6.31 Tridium Vykon Niagara Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.3.22.0 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.25.0 "Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.25.0 3.3.22.0" "Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.25.0 3.4.51.0" Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.25.1 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.34.0 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.34.2 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.39.0 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.40.7 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.5.7.0 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.6.31.0 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.6.31.4 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.6.47 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX 3.6.47.0 Tridium Vykon Niagara AX Tridium Vykon Niagara R2 2.301.522 Tridium Vykon Niagara R2 2.301.522.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara R2 2.301.529.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara R2 2.301.532.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara R2 R2.2.301.529 Tridium Vykon Niagara R2 Tridium Vykon Niagara 3.5.34.7 Tridium Vykon Workplace Pro 2.301.428 Tridium Vykon Workplace Pro 2.301.514 Tridium Vykon Workplace Pro 2.301.522 v2 Tridium Vykon Workplace Pro 2.301.532 Wonderware Intouch WindowViewer 10.1.200 Yokogawa Exaquantum EXAOPC R3.21 Yokogawa Exaquantum Exaquantum Server R2.60 Yokogawa DAQOPC for DARWIN R3.01 2 6.0 ACS Alerton 3.5.34 Alerton Apogee 2.8 BACnet CSView 11.5.0 build 121 DAQ Works V1.03 Delta-V 7.4 Delta-V DOS 6.2 ERI Excel add-in I/Net 1.02 I/Net 5.1.3-57 I/Net 5.1.4-59 I/Net INET 2000 1.11 build 170 Insight Metasys Power Xpert Software PR970 Prism Protech Siemens 11 SteamEye Symmetre Station 3.5 Tracer Summit 15.0 Versaterm, Crystal Reports VMware WEstation WIN UPM2 Workbench 2.301.522 Workbench 2.310.514



US Chamber of Commerce – Dec 2011

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics



CIO / IA Techs

- Not mine
- Not funded
- Not trained

Facility Mgr / Eng

- Not Mine
- Not funded
- Not trained

Which Group Best to Cyber Protect Control Systems?



Shodan Internet Connection Exploit




Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

- ICSA-12-228-01A: Tridium Niagara Vulnerabilities (Updated)
- ICSA-15-029-01 : Honeywell HART DTM Vulnerability
- ICSA-15-076-02 : Honeywell XL Web Controller Directory Traversal vulnerability
- ICSA-13-189-01 : QNX Multiple Vulnerabilities



Direct Internet connected HMI http, not https

Shodan – Tridium Search



HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
 WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="Niagara-Admin", qop="auth", algorithm="MD5", nonce="UvdrAWNmNDAwNjE1ODc4NzBhYTc5NjMyYzlkYTk3NTg1ZDQy"
 Content-Length: 56
 Content-Type: text/html
 Niagara-Platform: QNX
 Niagara-Started: 2013-8-3-4-11-32 Baja-Station-Brand: distech
 Niagara-HostId: Qnx-NPM2-0000-12EA-EDCC

Never Attribute Evil When Stupid is Still Available



PIT / CS in DoD Policy & NIST Guide

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

- DoDI 8500.01 **Cybersecurity** (14Mar14)
 - Defines Platform Information Technology (PIT) [ICS]
 - Directs identify and centrally register at Component level
 - Directs use of NIST standards
- DoDI 8510.01 **Risk Management Framework (RMF)** for DoD Information Technology (12Mar14)
 - DIACAP replaced by RMF [goal: reduce C&A time 50%]
 - Manages life-cycle cybersecurity risk; promotes reciprocity
- Under SECDEF for Installations & Environment (OUSD(I&E) memo **Real Property-related ICS Cybersecurity** (19Mar14)
- NIST SP 800-82 r2 **Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security** (May15)
- DoDI 8530.01 **Cybersecurity Activities Support to DoD Network Operations** (FINAL DRAFT)
 - DoD IN include systems operated by contractor, research centers, labs, agencies, non-DoD orgs



Cybersecurity Rules Apply to CS & Info Systems



Draft DoD Acquisition Language

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Construction

- 50-75% construction complete: conduct Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT) of major components
- 100% construction complete: conduct Site Acceptance Testing (SAT)
- Conduct Penetration Testing (e.g. SamuraiSTFU, special tool for ICS)
- Create System Security Plan (SSP)
- Create System Assessment Plan (SAP)
- Create CONOPS
- Create Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM)
- Create Incident Response Plan (IRP)

Based on DHS procurement document, DoD RMF, and GSA-DOD acquisition reform publications

Department of Homeland Security:
Cyber Security Procurement
Language for Control Systems

September 2009



Cybersecurity
Procurement Language
for Energy Delivery Systems

Energy Sector Control Systems
Working Group (ECSWG)

Improving Cybersecurity and
Resilience through Acquisition
[DRAFT] IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Version 1.0
February 2014

Planning and Design

- Apply hardening criteria (e.g. DoD STIGS)
- Penetration Testing (artifacts)
- Complete initial CSET evaluation at 90% design, initial system security plan/baseline risk assessment
- Conform with relevant **UFC** and UFGS




**Testing Use Cases:
SPIDERS, Fort Belvoir Microgrid**




DHS Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET)

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

CSET 6.2 has new DoD, CNSS, NIST and DHS references & GM plugin



Standards/Question Sets in CSET	Short Name
NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 3	800-53 R3
NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 3 App I	800-53 R3 App I
NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 4	800-53 R4
NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 4 App J	800-53 R4 App J
NIST Special Publication 800-82	SP800-82
NIST Special Publication 800-82 Rev 1	SP800-82 V1
NIST Special Publication 800-82 Rev 2 (Draft)	SP800-82 V2
Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG)	CAG
Components Questions Set	Components
CFATS Risk-Based Performance Standards Guide 8-Cyber	CFATS
CNSSI No. 1253 Baseline	CNSSI 1253
CNSSI No. 1253 Industrial Control System (ICS) Overlay V1	CNSSI ICS
Catalog of Recommendations Rev 7	COR 7
DOD Instruction 8500.2	DOD 8500.2
INGAA Control Systems Cyber Security Guidelines for the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry	INGAA
Key Questions Set	Key
NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity V1	NCSF V1
NEI 0809 Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors	NEI 0809
NERC CIP-002 through CIP-009 Rev 3	NERC Rev 3
NERC CIP-002 through CIP-009 Rev 4	NERC Rev 4
NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security: Vol. 1	NISTIR 7628
NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71	NRC 5.71
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines April 2011	TSA
Universal Questions Set	Universal



DoD Directed Standardized Assessments via CSET



DoD CIO RMF KS Portal – PIT/CS

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

EI&E Platform IT (PIT) Control Systems

Background

Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8500.01, *Cybersecurity*, and DoDI 8510.01, *Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT)*, incorporate Platform IT (PIT) into the RMF process. PIT is a category of both IT hardware and software that is physically part of, dedicated to, or essential in real time to the mission performance of special purpose systems. PIT is further categorized as PIT products, PIT subsystems, or PIT systems. PIT differs from “traditional” IT in that it is integral to – and dedicated to the operation of – a specific platform. Although the term PIT is used only by DoD, the concept of categorizing components and systems dedicated to the operation of a specific platform is not. For example, the term “Operational Technology” (OT) is also used to refer to these systems and components.

The most common forms of PIT are Control Systems (CS), which are a combination of control components (e.g., electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, or pneumatic, etc.), special purpose controlling devices, and standard IT that act together upon underlying mechanical and/or electrical equipment to achieve an objective (e.g., transport of matter or energy, maintain a secure and comfortable work environment, etc.). All automated control systems are considered PIT. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are automated control systems that act upon industrial systems and processes. ICS is used as a general term that encompasses several – but not all – types of control systems. These include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS) and other control systems, such as the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) often found in the industrial sector and critical infrastructure. In the past, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment (ASD(EI&E)) community used ICS in an even broader sense to represent all types of control systems (SCADA, DDC, DCS, building, vehicle, transportation, etc.). However, since most

Key Documents and Tools

[Overview of EI&E PIT Control Systems and Reference Architecture \(.pdf\)](#)

[EI&E PIT Control Systems Glossary \(.pdf\)](#)

[EI&E PIT Control System Master List \(.xlsx\)](#)

[NIST SP 800-82 R2 Industrial Control Systems Security Guide \(.pdf\)](#)

[NIST SP 800-82 R2 ICS Overlay Security Controls \(.xlsx\)](#)

[NIST SP 800-53 R4 and NIST SP 800-82 R2 Merged \(.docx\)](#)

[USACE Electronic Security Systems Performance Work Statement IA Enclosure 1 \(.pdf\)](#)


[DHS Interagency Security Committee: Securing Government Assets through Combined Traditional Security and Information Technology \(.pdf\)](#)

[DHS Cyber Security Evaluation Tool \(CSET\)](#)

[GAO 15-6 Federal Facility Cybersecurity \(.pdf\)](#)

[EI&E Control System and Information System Determination Process and Information Requirements for IT \(.pdf\)](#)

Figure 8 – Relationship of CSET, Component Registry, eMASS, and DITPR



RMF KS PIT CS Website Released DoD-wide Aug'15




DoD CIO Policy

RMF applies to all Information Technology

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Reduces exploitation of vulnerabilities in PIT, Services, or Products previously not secured or assessed

“All DoD-owned or DoD-controlled IT that receive, process, display or transmit DoD information”



Not a One Size Fits All Approach to Securing IT



**Step 1
CATEGORIZE
System**

- Categorize the system in accordance with the CNSSI 1253
- Initiate the Security Plan
- Register system with DoD Component Cybersecurity Program
- Assign qualified personnel to RMF roles

**Step 2
SELECT
Security Controls**

- Common Control Identification
- Select security controls
- Develop system-level continuous monitoring strategy
- Review and approve Security Plan and continuous monitoring strategy
- Apply overlays and tailor

**Step 6
MONITOR
Security Controls**

- Determine impact of changes to the system and environment
- Assess selected controls annually
- Conduct needed remediation
- Update Security Plan, SAR and POA&M
- Report security status to AO
- AO reviews reported status
- Implement system decommissioning strategy

**Step 5
AUTHORIZE
System**

- Prepare the POA&M
- Submit Security Authorization Package (Security Plan, SAR and PAO&M) to AO
- AO conducts final risk determination
- AO makes authorization decision



**Step 4
ASSESS
Security Controls**

- Develop and approve Security Assessment Plan
- Assess security controls
- SCA prepares Security Assessment Report (SAR)
- Conduct initial remediation actions

**Step 3
IMPLEMENT
Security Controls**

- Implement control solutions consistent with DoD Component Cybersecurity architectures
- Document security control implementation in Security Plan



Completed DIACAP Package Submitted to AO for Signature	ATO Date	Maximum Duration of ATO under DIACAP
DoD CIO Memo Date through May 31, 2015	Determined by AO Signature Date	2.5 years from AO signature date
June 1, 2015 through February 1, 2016		2 years from AO signature date
February 2, 2016 through October 1, 2016		1.5 years from AO signature date



Joint Base Architecture for Secure Industrial Control Systems

- Detect, Mitigate, Recover

- Develop TTP for defending DoD ICS / SCADA & PIT
- Test topology based on networks found during surveys
- Passive taps inserted for network monitoring
- Test focused on SCADA network, CS network, and End Point Device network
- Recognize enterprise network primarily used for attack positioning
- 2nd “field test” completed July ‘15
- TTP transition Dec ‘15



Monitor CS Networks For Malevolent / Unexpected Behavior



UFC Objectives

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Third Interim Draft UFC 4-010-06
6 January 2015

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

THIRD INTERIM DRAFT CYBERSECURING FACILITY CONTROL SYSTEMS



PRE-DECISIONAL; NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

1. Define new Design and Construction Methodology to apply RMF & NIST SP 800-82 ICS Security Guide
2. Define IT / CS Reference Architecture as it applies to Control Systems
3. Verify controls @ 50-75% construction: conduct Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT) of major components
4. Verify controls @ 100% construction complete: conduct Site Acceptance Testing (SAT)

Pre-Final Version by 30 Sept '15




Unclassified - Distribution Statement A



Cyber Range Control Systems?

An option: Camp Atterbury - Edinburg, IN

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics





FY15 / 16 JS Special Interest Items

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

- **Critical infrastructure links to Industrial Control Systems-Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (ICS/SCADA)**
 - a. Identify critical infrastructure dependent upon ICS/SCADA
 - b. Validate Info Sys architecture supporting operation of ICS/SCADA
 - c. Threat/Hazards identified to ICS/SCADA w/ appropriate countermeasures
- **Have ICS / SCADA systems been identified that support infrastructure throughout the installation?**
- **Has a Risk & Threat Assessment on all ICS / SCADA systems been conducted IAW NIST SP 800-82,800-30, and DoDI 8510.01?**
- **Are all appropriate ICS / SCADA Security Control Measures implemented IAW DoDI 8510.01 and NIST SP 800-53v4? [NIST SP 800-82 r2]**

Requires CIO & Facility SME Collaboration



Brief to HASC by 1/1/16

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

- DoD is transitioning to **smart buildings** increasingly utilizing wireless controls for heating, ventilation and air conditioning, security systems, lighting, electrical power, fire alarms, elevators, visitor controls, cellular communications, Wi-Fi networks, and first responder communications and other systems are increasing interconnected and online.
- Higher connectivity has increased the threat and vulnerability to cyber-attacks. Government Accountability Office study (GAO-15-6) highlighted the vulnerabilities and cyber risks to building and access control systems.
- Therefore, SECDEF to brief HASC 1/1/16 on the **cyber risks to smart buildings and access control systems** from **radio frequency systems** and **wireless communications**, and identification of **available technologies and practices available** to potentially **counter and mitigate the identified security risks.**"

OASD EI&E OPR, Coord w/ Components, USCC, CIO, USD(I)...



Control Systems Cyber Security Analysis

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Challenge: Cyber security for control systems is a formidable effort; DoD requires insight to problem scope and solutions

Focus: 10 installations directly supporting operations [IE&OE]

3 Complementary Lines of Effort – 12 months

- DoD's ICS Exposure to Internet Threats
- Gap Analysis of Tech. Solutions to Monitor DoD ICS
- Workforce Training Evaluation and Development

Benefits: Advances nascent ICS efforts in Defense community

- Give execs insight to set policy, reveal relevant cyber CS threats and vulnerabilities and gap between current and desired states
- Identify appropriate EI&E cyber workforce skills and requirements

JHU-APL Will Complete Assessments & Analysis w/ Service SMEs



Consistent Weak Link = WETWARE

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics



London Railway Station System Passwords Exposed On TV Documentary



DoD Cybersecurity Campaign memo (USCC, AT&L, CIO)

“Adversaries are actively attempting to access & establish a persistent presence in order to deny us access when most needed—and these threats continue to increase in scope and capability.”

“Most successful cyber attacks ...have been **attributed to human error**, either through improperly configured technological solutions or non-compliance with existing cybersecurity policy. Inspection reports continue to reveal Department-wide, **systemic shortfalls in implementing basic cybersecurity requirements** found in current policy, directives, and orders.”



Take-Away's



- Include PIT/CS in 'cyber-scape' analysis
- Partner Facility Engineer & CIO SMEs
- Baseline: Establish Your PIT/CS "*Position Zero*"
 - Known inventory, topology, processes and tasks, users, data flows
- Implement routine monitoring to recognize deviations; determine legit / malicious
- Exercise methodology prior to needing it!
- Implement Alert process (register w/ DHS)



- **POC: Mr. Daryl Haegley** daryl.r.haegley.civ@mail.mil