CommuniQué

Volume 2013-1 SPRING 2013

From the Classification Director's Office

With the economic challenges that continue to face the Government, it is more important than ever for those of us within the community to reflect on how we will continue to meet our responsibility to ensure an effective classification program as a whole, regardless of changes in budgets. What are our strengths and what areas need improvement? The only way to ensure that we are moving forward on the right path is to know where we have been and where we want to go.

What better time to pause and reflect than after the recent Presidential Inauguration and to be inspired by its theme —"Faith in America's Future"? The Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee for Inaugural Ceremonies, the Honorable Charles E. Schumer, recalled another time 150 years ago when our Nation endured great "travails" and financial difficulties during the Civil War. At that time, the Capitol dome was a "half built eyesore" and would not have been completed until after the war if

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GETTING TO KNOW YOU . . .
A Big Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) Project at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP) Maximizes Cost Savings While Protecting National Security

Department of Energy Order 475.2A, *Identifying Classified Information*, contains several requirements for Heads of HQ and Managers of field elements as well as COs/CRs to ensure that work in classified subject areas is not started until appropriate guidance is in place. Recent interaction between the Manager

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Upcoming Events 2013

April 23-25	CO Technical Program Review Meeting
June 4	General Course for Derivative Classifiers
June 11	General Course for Derivative Classifiers (Albuquerque)
June 12-13	General Course for Derivative Declassifiers (Albuquerque)
June 24-28	Overview of Nuclear Weapons Classification Course
July 30	General Course for Derivative Classifiers
September 17-19	General Course for Classification Officers/ Analysts
September 24	General Course for Derivative Classifiers (Albuquerque)

Note: Courses are conducted at DOE Headquarters, Germantown, MD, unless otherwise noted.

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President Lincoln hadn't intervened. Lincoln believed "the half-finished dome symbolized the half-divided nation" and felt that if the people could see the dome "going on," it would be a "sign" that the union would "go on." "And so, despite the conflict which engulfed the nation and surrounded the city, the dome continued to rise." The Senator concluded by pointing out that the problems we face today (i.e., "our own half-finished domes") are not more "intractable" or "complex" than those that the Nation has faced and overcome in the past.

Certainly, within the classification program, we are no strangers to challenges. However, we've had many success stories as well. The legacy of our nuclear program is a well-developed, organizational infrastructure that generates synergy by allowing HQ and field classification offices to work hand-in-hand to get the mission done.

Moving forward into 2013, we will continue to leverage this infrastructure to ensure that our community is able to fulfill its obligations to identify information vital to national security and nonproliferation interests, thereby ensuring that our adversaries cannot use it to develop nuclear weapons of mass destruction or harm national security interests. A key component in creating this synergy has been our ability to work together to develop and promulgate sound classification/ declassification policies and guidance as the foundation for document reviews. We must continue to maintain these strengths in 2013 and beyond.

Policy: Last year, the Office of Quality Management (HS-61) began working on revisions to DOE O 475.2A and 10 CFR part 1045, to include soliciting comments from the field and RD Management Officials respectively. HS-61 anticipates distributing the next draft of the order for comment by DOE elements this year and will also host additional working group meetings on the regulation.

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) under E.O. 13556 continues to be a focus. Last year, DOE identified information that is currently OUO for which there was no corresponding CUI category or subcategory. The CUI Executive Agent (EA) approved additional categories/ subcategories to fill several gaps. The CUI EA anticipates issuing a CUI regulation in 2013 at which point DOE will revise the initial DOE compliance plan, address any remaining gaps, and begin to develop implementing regulations/orders in coordination with the CUI Working Group. Until that happens, OUO and UCNI will continue to be used within DOE to protect sensitive unclassified information for the next few years.

Guidance: A number of changes to guidance in the safeguards and security area occurred last year as a result of the NSI Fundamental Classification Guidance Review (FCGR) completed by the Office of Technical Guidance (HS-62). This comprehensive evaluation, which went well beyond the minimum requirements in the E.O., resulted in the identification of several areas where guidance is being consolidated, eliminated, or clarified. CG-SS-5 is currently in development with Working Group meetings planned for mid-year. Revisions to guidance will continue into the foreseeable future to incorporate the FCGR recommendations. An equally rigorous review of RD by the Technical Evaluation Panel is currently under way, consistent with requirements in 10 CFR part 1045.

Document Reviews: The Office of Document Reviews (HS-63) continues to make significant strides in reducing the inventory of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Review requests. Last year, processing time decreased to 30 days, and HS-63 brought the inventory of requests down to less than 10. For FY 2013 and beyond, the goal is to maintain these remarkable achievements and lower costs further through process improvements, including further technology application.

Quality control reviews of other agency records to identify RD/FRD prior to public declassification continued at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD, and will continue into the foreseeable future. HS-63 halved the 360M-page backlog and plans to complete all records that have cleared the prerequisite review by other Government agencies for RD/FRD by December 31, 2013, or soon thereafter.

I would like to congratulate all of you on meeting the challenges of 2012. I have great confidence in your technical talent, unique expertise, and your willingness to go the extra mile to ensure that we do what is right, even though it may not always be easy. These are the tools that we will need to overcome the challenges that we face in 2013.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 903-3526 or at andrew.weston-dawkes@hq.doe.gov.

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of the Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office (PPPO) and the PPPO CO* serves as a textbook example of necessary site coordination to ensure appropriate guidance was in place prior to the start of a big D&D Project at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. This collaboration, which was supported by the Office of Environmental Management, resulted in a strategy to protect the classified elements of this highly sensitive technology capable of producing enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons while at the same time providing an opportunity to identify certain elements that could be declassified to allow the use of uncleared workers for significant cost savings.

For those who may not be familiar with gaseous diffusion technology, a "converter" contains an assembly of barrier tubes that are used to produce uranium enriched in the 235 isotope by separating out the heavier 238 isotope. A "compressor" is used to push the UF_6 gas through the barrier for separation. This compressor contains a special seal to prevent leakage into or out of the compressor. Limited information about the compressor seals and certain views of the converter was declassified and implemented in November 2012 through TNP-42.

This declassification allows the compressors to be shipped for disposal using uncleared personnel. At a cost savings of $3,000 per shipment, significant savings are realized given that the thousands of compressors will require many hundreds of shipments. The use of railcars may reduce this even more. An added benefit of this declassification is the reduced worker exposure to radiation.

The fate of the converters is still undetermined and depends on the economics of recovering nickel. Further declassifications are being planned. Total savings expected to be realized through implementation of TNP-42 may exceed $100 million. The lessons learned from the D&D of the Portsmouth GDP will be applied to the D&D of the Paducah GDP when it is returned to DOE by USEC.

The moral of the story is that by working early on with project planners to identify where minimal declassifications can be of great use to the project, PPPO will maximize cost savings while still protecting the National Security.

For more information, please contact Larry Sparks at (865) 576-2659, or for questions about TNP-42 contact Edie Chalk, Director, Office of Technical Guidance, at (301) 903-1185 or edie.chalk@hq.doe.gov.

* NOTE: Larry Sparks serves as CO for both Oak Ridge and PPPO.



Revisions to CG-CI-1 and CG-IN-1 Guides: Use of Exemption 3 for Intelligence-Related OUO

Official Use Only (OUO) within the Intelligence Community (IC) differs from the rest of the DOE classification community that uses exemption 7 (Law Enforcement) for security-related OUO that used to fall under exemption 2 in accordance with Policy Bulletin-4 (POL-4), *Exemption 2 Guidance*, Change 1.

When change 2 was issued for CG-CI-1, *DOE Classification Guide for Counterintelligence Information*, it heralded the use of a new exemption category for documents containing intelligence-related OUO. The majority of topics that used exemption 2 for OUO were changed to exemption 3 (Statutory Exemption) consistent with the National Security Act of 1947. Replacement of exemption 2 with exemption 3, rather than exemption 7, reflects the fact that the DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence falls under E.O. 12333 as an intelligence agency and is not a law enforcement agency. With the addition of exemption 3, OUO topics in CG-CI-1 will now specify exemption 3 and/or exemption 6 as appropriate.

Similar changes are forthcoming for OUO topics in CG-IN-1, *DOE Classification Guide for Intelligence Information*. Change 3 is currently with the Program Office for concurrence.

NOTE: Although guide topics in CG-CI-1 specify "OUO," the marking syntax used for documents intended for dissemination to the rest of the IC outside of DOE is "For Official Use Only" or "FOUO" consistent with markings used within the IC.

FOIAs, MANDATORYs and APPEALs (Oh, MY!!)

Although the terms "FOIA" and "Mandatory" circulate regularly through the Classification Community, you may not understand the differences between them. So, what are they?

A "FOIA request" is a request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552, as amended) provides that any person has a right, enforceable in court, to obtain access to Federal records (documents). Requests can be made for specific agency documents (classified or unclassified) or for documents in particular subject areas. The Department of Energy (DOE) FOIA Office handles requests for our agency's documents and directs the appropriate Program Office or field element to search for and produce the documents.

A "Mandatory" or "MDR," governed by Executive Order (E.O.) 13526, is a request for a ***M***andatory ***D***eclassification ***R***eview of a classified document. Like the FOIA, anyone can request a document under the MDR process. Unlike the FOIA, the request must be for a specific *classified* document or documents. Also unlike the FOIA, an MDR request comes to the Office of Classification (OC), and OC contacts the Program Office or field element to find the document.



Since the Government does not release classified information to the public, classified documents that are responsive to a FOIA or MDR must be reviewed to identify classified content. If the Program Office or field element determines that the requested document no longer contains classified information, it can declassify the document. If it determines that the document still contains classified information, both the FOIA and the E.O. allow DOE to deny that information to the public. For a FOIA request, National Security Information (NSI) is denied using exemption 1, and RD/FRD are denied using exemption 3. For a Mandatory request, NSI can be denied by Section 1.4 of the E.O. and RD/FRD by Section 6.2 (a).

However, before the information can be denied, the OC conducts a second review to verify that the information is still classified. The Director, OC, who serves as the Denying Official for all classified information, then approves the removal of the classified information to produce an unclassified (or "redacted") version.

FOIAs, MANDATORYs and APPEALs (Oh, MY!!) . . . *continued from page 4*

Even after classified information is denied under either type of review, requesters may still appeal the denial in accordance with the procedures and requirements for requesters/agencies in the E.O. and FOIA. Essentially, the documents get a "second look" review, normally by very senior document reviewers, to determine if any additional information, denied the first time, might be released. As with MDR and FOIA requests, appeals also have a Denying Official for classified information. Within DOE, the Principal Deputy Chief for Mission Support Operations in the Office of Health, Safety and Security performs this function.

Of course, simply removing the classified information from the document doesn't make it publicly releasable. Both the FOIA and the E.O. provide specific directions on what types of unclassified information may be withheld or "denied." The FOIA provides nine exemptions, eight of which can be used to deny unclassified information in documents requested under the FOIA. For example, exemption 6 allows the Government to withhold personal information, and exemption 3 allows Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information to be denied. As with classified information, when DOE denies unclassified information in requested documents, the Program Office or field element must provide the name of a Denying Official, and the requester can still appeal the denial of exempted unclassified information.


U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Classification
Washington, DC 20585

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Director
Office of Classification
Office of Health, Safety and Security

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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This is just a very brief overview. If you have any questions about the FOIA or MDR process, please contact Fletcher Whitworth at (301) 903-3865 or fletcher.whitworth@hq.doe.gov.

DOE FOIA & Mandatory Review Process for Classified Documents

ACTION	FOIA (RD/FRD/NSI)	MANDATORY (RD/FRD/NSI)
Receives Request	FOIA Office	Office of Classification (OC)
Processes Request	FOIA Office	OC
Locates Document(s)	Program Office or field element	Program Office or field element
Conducts 1st Review	Program Office or field element	Program Office or field element
Conducts 2nd Review	Program Office or field element (if document is declassified) or OC (if classified information is denied)	Program Office or field element (if document is declassified) or OC (if classified information is denied)
Identifies CUI	Program Office or field element	Program Office or field element

Electronic Bracketing and Redaction: "The Devil is in the Details"

"Man must shape his tools lest they shape him." *Arthur Miller*

A tool is something that can be used for good or for evil (e.g., a rope can be used to secure a box, or it can be used to tie someone up). Even though this is not an original concept, it certainly applies to using electronic technology as a tool for bracketing and redaction. While electronic tools can make bracketing and redaction quicker and easier, it is also important to consider the dangers that may lurk behind these technologies and ensure our bracketing and redaction procedures guard against them.

What are some of the concerns surrounding electronic bracketing and redaction?

Bracketing: Let's look at bracketing first. The most important issue with bracketing any document, whether it is electronic or hardcopy, is ensuring that the brackets cannot be changed or removed prior to redacting the document by taking the sensitive information (either classified or controlled unclassified) out of it. Of course, we're all familiar with the potential perils of a taped-on piece of paper that covers sensitive information falling off of a hardcopy document or inadvertently repositioning itself. Although it may seem like technology should somehow "magically" make things easier, there are still issues with electronic bracketing (e.g., an electronic bracket in MicroSoft Word shifts during electronic transmission or when printed out in hardcopy), and the consequences of a changed bracket are no less serious (i.e., the potential release of classified or controlled unclassified information that hasn't been redacted).

Redaction: Issues with electronic bracketing are just the tip of the iceberg (to use an old, but still relevant cliché). When it comes to electronic file redaction, things get even more complicated! Highlighting text in black or placing a black image over it using the annotation tools in early versions of Acrobat removes the text from view, but does not remove it from the file. Even when text appears to have been removed (i.e., redacted) visually, it can still remain hidden in the file as "metadata" that can be recovered by an adversary or individuals without appropriate access authorizations.

Have there really been problems?

In 2005, the National Security Agency (NSA) responded to the "ongoing challenge" faced by Government agencies conducting redactions to ensure that sensitive information would not be inadvertently released by publishing a report, *Redacting with Confidence: How to Safely Publish Sanitized Reports Converted from Word to PDF*." These "challenges" were also described in a 2006 GCN article, available on the web,* as "a series of embarrassing and potentially damaging leaks of information throughout the government" where electronic files containing sensitive information were released to the public with sensitive information obscured but not irretrievably removed. The article quotes an NSA spokesperson: "Improper redaction of electronic documents has been a growing area of concern in the information assurance community, so NSA decided to publish security guidance to help address this concern. . . ." In one case, sensitive information blacked out in a PDF file revealed the "hidden" words through a simple cut and paste.

* Web article. *GCN: Technology, Tools and Tactics for Public Sector IT*. *NSA Urges Use of Better Redaction Methods*. Patience Wait (GCN Staff). 2/20/06.

This is 2013—Haven't Updated Versions of Adobe Software Solved These Problems? And What About the Updated NSA Guideline on Using Adobe Acrobat Professional X to Redact PDF Files?

Recent versions of Adobe Acrobat have added increased functionality; however, none of these tools has received the rigorous scrutiny needed to examine how they function within the DOE operating environment to ensure with the highest degree of confidence that classified information in redacted files released to the public truly cannot be recovered. Any effort to validate and certify redaction software with the goal of ensuring this degree of confidence represents an expensive and challenging proposition at best, and efforts to conduct this type of rigorous testing would only represent a "snapshot" in time. Given the frequency of software changes and updates (to include patches), as well as releases of newer versions of Adobe, and the potential for various

Electronic Bracketing and Redaction: "The Devil is in the Details" *. . . continued from page 6*

elements within DOE to be operating with different releases of the Acrobat software (i.e., the need to ensure "backward compatibility" of any DOE-validated version), it would be difficult to maintain a high degree of assurance for any extended period of time that these tools/applications were performing as advertised.

So, Where Does That Leave Someone Who Wants to do Electronic Bracketing or Who Needs an Electronic Copy of a Redacted Document?

Between the procedures established by NSA and the tools provided with later versions of Adobe Acrobat, individuals within DOE who want to use electronic tools to bracket classified documents for transmission to other DOE elements over classified systems can do so with a high degree of confidence that their brackets will not shift during transmission of electronic documents. The key is to convert the file to a PDF once the brackets are in place as described in the following article from the Office of Document Reviews.

However, when it comes to redacting classified information from an electronic file so it can be released to the public without inadvertent recovery of classified information, the devil is in the details! In accordance with attachment 8 of DOE O 475.2A, *Identifying Classified Information*, the preparer must print a redacted paper copy of the document and then scan it back in and save it as a PDF file. This file is the final electronic redacted version and may be distributed and released as desired.

This is the same procedure followed by "big name" agencies within the intelligence community that do not currently release redacted versions of classified electronic files to the public. It is also consistent with the memo from the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) in which ISOO took the lead to consult with "subject matter experts to identify technical guidance concerning appropriate methods, equipment, and standards for redaction." Recent correspondence between the Office of Classification and ISOO confirmed that technical guidance has not been issued.

Special thanks to Gary Dewitt, Ron McIntosh, Dan Gerth, and Lesley Nelson-Burns who provided assistance in writing this article. If you have questions about requirements for bracketing and redaction, please contact the Office of Classification Outreach Program at (301) 903-7567 or outreach@hq.doe.gov.

Ensuring Bracketing Integrity in the Electronic Environment

With the recent extended connectivity of the HSS Classified Local Area Network (CLAN) to other DOE classified networks, the Office of Document Reviews (HS-63) is beginning to see an increasing number of requests for bracketing reviews (e.g., FOIA and Mandatory reviews) arriving as classified e-mails from the Program Offices and field elements. Suppose you're a Derivative Classifier who has been asked by your local classification office to conduct the first bracketing review of a classified electronic document for your Program Office or field element. What do you need to know?

First and foremost is the need to ensure that any modification of the brackets is agreed to by both reviewers (i.e., Program Office/field element and Office of Classification). Also, when transmitting the document electronically, it is particularly important to ensure there is no potential for brackets to shift as described in the previous article *Electronic Bracketing and Redaction: "The Devil is in the Details*." The best way to do this is to save the file as a PDF and use Adobe Acrobat Professional software to do the bracketing. This file type will allow HS-63 to work with the Program Office or field element to adjust the first set of brackets, if needed, while still ensuring that the brackets have not shifted during transmission (the way that they might in a Word document).

Once HS-63 receives the documents in PDF format, it uses customized bracketing and marking tools to apply an "overlay" that includes review stamps, exemptions, RD/FRD admonishments, etc. This overlay can be readily applied to any document, whether in "image" format or Optical Character Recognition (OCR—searchable text).

Although the use of Adobe software makes this task easier, there are some practical issues concerning application of the bracketing software, particularly since documents may be bracketed by multiple Offices or elements with equities in the document using different electronic tools within the Acrobat software. For example, when it comes to applying the bracketing boxes, precision can be an issue (e.g., potential for some text to be unintentionally bracketed due to overlapping of the text boxes). Or,

Ensuring Bracketing Integrity in the Electronic Environment *. . . Continued from page 7*

there can be issues when using other than the polygon tool to apply brackets (closed polygons), such as the use of multiple, box-type individual rectangles on each line obliterating text so that succeeding reviewers cannot read it at a normal zoom.

Additionally, external configuration control is a concern. HS-63 is currently discussing options to ensure version control as multiple versions of a document are generated at different stages of the review or in response to the individual needs of different stakeholders (e.g., review and comment version, controlled unclassified version that only has the classified information bracketed for redaction generated for Congress, version with both classified and controlled unclassified bracketed for redaction, etc.). Since HS-63 is trying to develop a method that works for everyone, it welcomes input from the field elements and Program Offices.

Once the brackets are finalized, the redacted copy is prepared by the Program Office or the field element. The final version of the redacted document must be checked to ensure that all sensitive information identified by the brackets (i.e., classified, Official Use Only, and Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information) was properly removed. Detailed requirements concerning bracketing and redacting procedures can be found in Attachments 7 and 8 of *DOE O 475.2A, Identifying Classified Information*. If an electronic copy of the redacted document is needed, the preparer must print a redacted paper copy of the document and then scan it back in and save it as a PDF file. This file is the final electronic redacted version and may be distributed and released as desired.

Special thanks to Mike Kolbay, Sherman Fivozinsky, Bob Shankle, Ralph Hitchens, and Gary Dewitt who provided assistance in writing this article. If you have questions about requirements for bracketing and redaction, please contact the Office of Classification Outreach Program at (301) 903-7567 or outreach@hq.doe.gov.

PERSONNEL UPDATES

Welcome (New COs/PCOs/HCRs)

Paula P. Bachelor, CO, PNNL
John T. Barton, CO, B&W Y-12
Tyrone L. Sanders, PCO & HCR, EM
Fletcher Whitworth, HCR, HSS

Farewell (Outgoing COs/PCOs/HCRs)

Thomas D. Anderson, PCO & HCR, EM (Retired)
Christine A. Bauman, CO, PNNL (Stepped down)
Mary Deffenbaugh, HCR, HSS (Still serving the Office of Classification within HS-61)
J. Steven Kyle, CO, B&W Y-12 (New position)

Technical Evaluation Panel Status Update: Declassification in Action

Technical Evaluation Panel (TEP) meetings were held at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on December 11-13, 2012, and at Los Alamos National Laboratory on March 5-7, 2013. The review of Restricted Data for declassification continued, and three specific neutron generator declassification proposals were reviewed and discussed. These proposals were developed by the Neutron Generator Evaluation Group (NGEG) in response to a review of neutron generator technology requested by the Office of Classification. During the two meetings, several potential declassifications were identified, and a topical path forward for the remaining meetings in 2013 was mapped out.

Restricted Data subject areas discussed included detonation systems, boosting, initiators, interstage information, and secondaries. The TEP's review resulted in the identification of one boosting and three initiator-related pieces of information as candidates for declassification.

The TEP also endorsed all three NGEG proposals. If approved, they will result in declassifications that include shelf life and the cleaning process used during production of the tubes.

The next step is for the Office of Classification to brief equity holders on the seven declassification proposals and obtain program office endorsement. Formal declassification packages will then be prepared and submitted for HS-1 approval.

Sites and laboratories can also submit declassification proposals in any subject area for TEP discussion, as they always have, by addressing the six presumptions for classification and declassification from 10 CFR 1045.16. Review and coordination of these proposals will continue as it has in the past. There are two more opportunities to present proposals this calendar year. These meetings are scheduled for the weeks of August 5 and November 18 at LANL.

If you have any questions, please contact Edie Chalk, Director, Office of Technical Guidance, at (301) 903-1185 or edie.chalk@hq.doe.gov.

Lessons Learned from Self-Assessment and Document Decision Review Reports

In the last issue of the CommuniQué, we provided information on "What You Can Do to Ensure a Successful Self-Assessment." Of course, one of the best things you can do to improve your classification program is to learn from your own self-evaluations or the self-evaluations of other programs. Since that article, we have received several self-assessment and document decision review reports from the field and conducted five additional on-site evaluations. By analyzing these reports, we identified the following issues that you should guard against:

- Derivative Classifiers (DCs) and Derivative Declassifiers are not using the most current classification guidance. This continues to be an area that requires constant attention.

- DCs are not properly annotating the "Derived From" line when a guide is used. The DC must include the short title of the classification guide, the date of the guide, and the agency and organization that originated the guide. The Office of Classification (OC) is the originator for all DOE guides. An example of a correctly annotated "Derived From" line can be found below.

  Derived From: CG-XX-2, 9/10/13, DOE OC

- DCs are not properly annotating the "Classified By" line. The DC must include his or her name and position title as well as the agency and office of origin, if not otherwise evident. An example of a correctly annotated "Classified By" line can be found below.

  Classified By: John Doe, Director, DOE Office of Security

- Organizations are not sending the final self-assessment and document decision review reports to the Office of Classification within the required time period.

- Organizations are not updating all of their local procedures to be consistent with the current classification policies.

- Organizations are not covering all of the required areas in their classification training materials (initial and annual classification awareness briefings and DC training).

Knowledge Check Questions

1. What is one of the primary differences between a FOIA and a Mandatory Review request?

   A. Mandatory Review request must be for a specific document, whereas a FOIA request could be for a particular subject area.

   B. RD and FRD cannot be requested through a Mandatory Review request.

   C. There is no procedure to appeal a decision to withhold information under a Mandatory Review request.

   D. Only classified information can be denied under a Mandatory Review request.

2. Which of the following is the correct way to annotate the "Derived From" line on the DC marking assuming that DOE Guide CG-XX-1, dated 9/21/2010, was used?

   A. Derived From: CG-XX-1, DOE OC

   B Derived From: CG-XX-1, 9/21/2010, DOE OC

   C. Derived From: CG-XX-1, 9/21/2010

   D. Derived From: CG-XX-1

3. In addition to the DC's name, what other information is required on the "Classified By" line of the DC marking?

   A. The position title

   B. If not otherwise evident, the office of the DC

   C. If not otherwise evident, the agency of the DC

   D. All of the above.

4. In general, Policy Bulletin-4, Change 1, Exemption 2 Guidance, states that in classification guidance where the topic cites OUO Exemption 2, users should instead use Exemption 7. One exception to this is for topics that address counterintelligence equities. For those topics, which of the following exemptions should be used.

   A. Exemption 1

   B. Exemption 3

   C. Exemption 4

   D. Exemption 6

Correct answers are revealed on page 12.

Guidance Status as of 3/22/13

Classification Guides (CG)

CG-CB-3. Incorporating recommendations from FCGR. In development.

CG-CI-2. Program office developing draft. Will incorporate FCGR recommendations.

CG-ECP-1. *Joint DOE/NRC Classification Guide for the European Centrifuge Program.* Program office resolving comments from Technology Team Leader.

CG-ES-1, Change 1/CG-ES-1A, Change 1. Awaiting Air Force FCGR recommendations. Will incorporate results from DoD within 60 days of receipt.

CG-GSP-1/CG-GSP-1A. *DOE Classification Guide for Graded Security Protection/Supplement.* Working Group meeting with HS-52 and SMEs planned for early April.

CG-IGC-1, Change 3. Incorporating UCNI topics from ORO and other editorial corrections. Awaiting declassification determination before finalizing.

CG-IN-1, Change 3. In concurrence.

CG-IN-2. Program office developing draft. Will incorporate FCGR recommendations.

CG-IND-2. Program office comments received and under review.

CG-MC&A-1. *Classification and UCNI Guide for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.* Draft in internal review. Working Group meeting planned for April.

CG-MOX-1/CG-MOX-1A. *Joint DOE/NRC Classification and UCNI Guide for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility/Annex.* With HS-50 for concurrence.

CG-MPCA-1, Change 2/ CG-MPCA-1A, Change 2. Incorporating recommendations from FCGR. Draft sent to program office for review.

CG-MPP-3. Incorporating TNP-3, TNP-11, and recommendations from the FCGR.

CG-NMP-2, Change 5. Incorporating recommendations from the FCGR. Draft to program office by March 31.

Guidance Issued since Index 2013-01

Headquarters Guidance
CG-DNC-2, Change 3. *DOE Classification Guide for Designators, Nicknames, and Codewords* (3/22/13)
CG-DR-2. *DOE Classification Guide for Disassembly and Reuse* (1/30/13)
CG-SGC-1, Change 2. *Joint DOE/DoD Classification Guide for Safeguard C* (1/30/13)

Local Guidance
CG-SNL/NM-W76 (Mod 0)-1, Change 1. *Classification Guide for the W76-0/Mk4 Nuclear Warhead/Reentry Body for the Trident Missile* (1/30/13)

Bulletins
TNP-46. *Guidance for Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Program Equipment Inspections* (1/30/13)
TNP-47. *Access Change to RULLI Information* (3/4/13)

CG-NRI-1, Change 1. Incorporating recommendations from the FCGR and adding guidance on stabilization.

CG-OST-1. *Office of Secure Transportation Classification and UCNI Guide.* In concurrence.

CG-PD-1/CG-PD-1A. *Classification Guide for Proliferant Detection Technology/Annex.* In development.

CG-PET-1, Change 1. Program office developing draft.

CG-PGD-6. Implementing FCGR recommendations and TNP-42.

CG-RC-3. Edited draft submitted to program office for review.

CG-RDD-2. Rewriting vulnerability section.

CG-RER-1, Change 3. Draft change at NA-42 for review.

CG-US-SILEX-2. U.S. only version published. Joint version now in coordination with Australian government.

CG-SIV-1. *Classification and UCNI Guide for Secure Intra-Site Vehicles.* Received draft from Sandia on 1/31/13. Under internal review.

CG-SLD-1. *Second Line of Defense Classification Guide.* In concurrence.

CG-SNS-1. *DOE/DoD/NASA Classification Guide for Space Nuclear Systems.* Draft received from program office. In internal review. Will replace TNP-33, TNP-48, CG-RP-1, CG-SNR-1, and CG-SRPS-1.

CG-SS-5. In development. Chapter-specific Working Group meetings with SMEs being scheduled for March and April.

CG-SST-1. *Safe Secure Trailer Classification and UCNI Guide.* In concurrence.

CG-SV-2. *Classification Guide for Security Verification Program.* At SNL/NM for comment resolution.

CG-TNF-1. *Inter-Agency Classification Guide for Technical Nuclear Forensics.* In concurrence.

CG-TP-2. With NNSA for concurrence.

CG-TSCM-1, Change 1. Working Group meeting occurred March 20. Guide is being rewritten to address Working Group comments.

CG-TSS-4/CG-TSS-4A. In concurrence.

Guidance Status (continued)

Local Classification Guides (CG)

CG-SNL/CA-W87-1. W87/Mk21 *Nuclear Warhead Classification Guide.* Incorporated additional changes requested by SNL/CA. In concurrence.

CG-SNL/NM-W78-2. *Classification Guide for the W78/Mk12A Nuclear Warhead/Reentry Vehicle.* In concurrence.

Topical Classification Guides (TCG)

TCG-NAS-2, Change 7. In development; change will incorporate SSP rescission topics.

TCG-SAFF-3. Working Group scheduled for April 2-3 at SNL/NM.

TCG-WM-2, Change 1. Incorporating changes from FCGR and topics from WNP-116. Request to field for changes was sent on January 4.

TCG-WPMU-3. At DoD for signature and approval.

TCG-WS-2. Under development; revision will incorporate SSP rescission topics.

TCG-WT-1, Change 10. At DoD for comment

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UCNI Topical Guidelines (TG)

TG-NNP-2. In development.

Classification Bulletins (TNP, WNP)

TNP-45. *Guidance for Project RAGNAROK.* Draft with program office to resolve comments.

TNP-48. *Guidance for Pu-238 Inventories.* This is an update to TNP-33. In concurrence.

WNP-141. *Thorium Inventory.* In concurrence.

WNP-XXX. *Nuclear Enterprise Assurance.* Final review by program office (NA-124). WNP number to be assigned upon completion of final review.

If you have any questions, please contact Edie Chalk, Director, Office of Technical Guidance, at (301) 903-1185 or at edie.chalk@hq.doe.gov.

NOTE: Please contact Sandy Dorsey for copies of guides at (301) 903-3688 or Sandy.Dorsey@hq.doe.gov.

Responses to Knowledge Check Questions from page 10:

Question 1 answer: A

Question 2 answer: B

Question 3 answer: D

Question 4 answer: B

COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS IN THIS COMMUNIQUÉ

CO	Classification Officer
CR	Classification Representative
CUI	Controlled Unclassified Information
DC	Derivative Classifier
DD	Derivative Declassifier
HS-60	Office of Classification
OUO	Official Use Only
PCO	Program Classification Officer
UCNI	Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

Got an idea for an article? We'd love to hear from you! Please contact Mary Deffenbaugh at mary.deffenbaugh@hq.doe.gov.