



U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Inspector General
Office of Inspections

Inspection Report

Inspection of Implementation of
Corrective Actions Resulting From
Force-on-Force Performance Tests

DOE/IG-0585

February 2003




Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

February 12, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM:


Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION: Report on "Inspection of Implementation of
Corrective Actions Resulting From Force-on-Force Performance Tests"

BACKGROUND

Force-on-force performance tests were conducted in 2000 by the Department of Energy's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance as part of their reviews at the Pantex Plant (Pantex) and at Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Technical Area 18. These tests utilized an adversary team to assess the skills, procedures and equipment of forces responsible for site security. The purpose of our inspection was to determine if these sites had taken corrective actions to address the findings resulting from these tests.

RESULTS OF INSPECTION

The tests at Pantex resulted in one finding, which was closed, and the tests at LANL resulted in six findings, which were open at the time of our inspection. We found that corrective action plans and associated milestones have been developed for each of the findings at both sites. We determined that the process of documenting activities associated with corrective action plan milestones at LANL could be improved.

At Pantex, we observed a Security Police Officer (SPO) who did not have a protective mask, a required piece of equipment, while on patrol. We determined that contractual and procedural issues prevented supervisors from ensuring that SPOs had all required equipment before going on patrol and concluded that actions are needed to ensure that complete fitness-for-duty checks are performed.

We recommended that LANL officials ensure that internal controls are strengthened so that completion of each corrective action milestone for future force-on-force findings is adequately documented. We also recommended that internal policies and procedures at Pantex be reviewed and strengthened to ensure that 100 percent complete fitness-for-duty checks of SPOs are performed.



MANAGEMENT REACTION

Management concurred with our recommendations and advised that the Los Alamos Site Office is taking action to preclude recurrence of the documentation issues. They further advised that the Federal Site Manager for Pantex would review the noted discrepancy to determine what corrective actions should be taken.

Attachment

cc: Deputy Secretary
Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment
Director, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance
Director, Office of Security
Chief, Defense Nuclear Security
Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management

INSPECTION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS RESULTING FROM FORCE-ON-FORCE PERFORMANCE TESTS

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Overview

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE

The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) conducts reviews of Department of Energy (DOE) facilities and operations to evaluate the status of, among other things, safeguards and security matters. Integral to these reviews are force-on-force performance tests. These are major tests of the overall effectiveness of all site safeguards and security elements involved in responding to a hypothetical threat scenario based on the design basis threat¹ and identified site-specific threats. These tests employ an adversary team that tests the skills, procedures and equipment of those forces responsible for protecting DOE site security interests.

The objective of our inspection was to determine if DOE has taken corrective actions to address findings resulting from recent force-on-force performance tests that were conducted at the Pantex Plant (Pantex) during January 24-March 17, 2000, and at Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Technical Area 18 during October 2-12, 2000.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The force-on-force tests at Pantex resulted in one finding. The finding was validated as completed on December 19, 2000. The tests at LANL resulted in six findings, which were open at the time of our inspection. We found that corrective action plans and associated milestones have been developed for each of the findings at both sites. We determined that the process of documenting activities associated with corrective action plan milestones at LANL could be improved.

We also determined that conflicts between security procedures and local security contracts created problems for supervisors at Pantex when conducting required fitness-for-duty checks of all Security Police Officers (SPOs). These checks are conducted to ensure that SPOs have all required equipment before going on patrol. While not in the scope of the inspection, we observed one SPO who did not have his protective mask while on patrol at Pantex. We subsequently learned that procedural difficulties prevented supervisors from ensuring that SPOs had all required equipment before going on patrol. We concluded that actions are needed to ensure that complete fitness-for-duty checks are performed.

¹ The design basis threat, which is issued by the Office of Security, identifies and characterizes the potential generic adversary threats to DOE programs and facilities.

Details of Findings

Closure of LANL Milestones

We determined that all six findings at LANL were open because closure of the corrective action plans was dependent upon completion of long-term milestones associated with the corrective actions. These included a major construction project and actions not directly within LANL's control, such as assessments by outside agencies.

We found the following issues regarding LANL's documentation of milestones:

- Documentation supporting the closure of three milestones in one corrective action plan and one milestone in another corrective action plan was not included in the files;
- Documentation supporting two corrective action plans incorrectly indicated that a milestone in each plan was closed; and
- Action relating to changes in one key milestone was not adequately coordinated with all appropriate officials, mistakenly resulting in a two-year extension of the milestone.

Upon learning of these issues from the Office of Inspector General, DOE's Los Alamos Area Office and the Director of LANL's Security and Safeguards Division, took immediate corrective actions.

Fitness-for-Duty Checks

During our inspection, we found that protective force supervisors at Pantex were not conducting complete fitness-for-duty checks of all SPOs. The checks ensure that SPOs possess all necessary and critical equipment before reporting for duty and are required by Pantex's "Security Force Orders, Supervisors Guidelines," dated July 1, 2001. Inspectors observed one SPO who did not possess a critical piece of equipment (i.e., protective mask) while on patrol. We found that conflicts involving the supervisor's guidelines, the negotiated union agreements, and unwritten safety practices created an environment where complete fitness-for-duty checks were not being conducted.

According to a senior Pantex official, the current procedure for fitness-for-duty checks "...as written now, is unenforceable." We learned that the current guidelines call for these checks to be conducted before official duty time, which is contrary to the negotiated agreements. Under a current unwritten practice and as an apparent compromise, supervisors conduct a limited fitness check of SPOs in the armory when the SPOs check out their weapons before going on duty.

Recommendations

However, another unwritten safety practice prevents the SPOs from bringing all required duty equipment into the armory. Consequently, the supervisors' fitness checks do not ensure that SPOs have all required duty equipment before going on patrol.

We concluded that internal policies and procedures need to be reviewed and strengthened at LANL to ensure that corrective action milestones are adequately documented. Inadequate documentation may lead to an oversight with respect to an important corrective measure. Additionally, policies and procedures at Pantex should be strengthened to ensure that complete fitness-for-duty checks are performed before SPOs go on patrol. Proper equipment is imperative for SPO safety and a viable site protective strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Associate Administrator for Facilities and Operations, National Nuclear Security Administration, ensure that:

1. LANL officials ensure that internal controls are strengthened so that completion of each corrective action milestone for future force-on-force findings is adequately documented.
2. Internal policies and procedures at Pantex are reviewed and strengthened to ensure that 100 percent complete fitness-for-duty checks of SPOs are performed.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

In comments dated December 4, 2002, management concurred with our recommendations. Management advised that the Los Alamos Site Office is working with the LANL Safeguards and Security Division to preclude recurrence of the documentation processing issues. They further advised that the Federal Site Manager and the contractor at Pantex will review the noted discrepancy and the contract to determine what corrective actions should be taken.

INSPECTOR'S COMMENTS

We consider management's comments and actions responsive to our recommendations and the issues addressed in our report.

Appendix A

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Our review was conducted during the period February 2002 to April 2002. As part of our review, we interviewed Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters officials in the Office of Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA); and the Office of Security. We also interviewed DOE officials at the Los Alamos Area Office and the Office of Amarillo Site Operations, as well as DOE contractor officials at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Pantex Plant.

We reviewed documentation concerning force-on-force performance tests and OA inspections including:

- DOE Order 470.2A, “Security and Emergency Management Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance Program,” dated March 1, 2000.
- DOE Order 470.1, “Safeguards and Security Program,” dated September 28, 1995.
- DOE Order 473.2, “Protective Force Program,” dated June 30, 2000.
- DOE Manual 473.2-2 Chg 1, “Protective Force Program Manual,” dated December 20, 2001.
- OA report entitled “Independent Safeguards and Security Inspection of the Pantex Plant,” dated April 17, 2000.
- OA report entitled “Special Review of Security Measures at TA-18, Los Alamos National Laboratory,” dated October 31, 2000.
- DOE Order 5632.7A, “Protective Force Program,” dated April 13, 1994.

We also reviewed the corrective action plans addressing the OA inspections at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Pantex Plant.

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspections” issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

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