RICHLAND, Wash. – Imagine cutting a hole in the side of a nuclear facility that once produced weapons-grade plutonium to safely remove debris.

   It’s happening at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site. A large access opening with new doors has been engineered so employees can remove large pieces of contaminated equipment more safely than size-reducing inside and hauling the pieces down stairs for load-out. 

   During production days and later, numerous safety controls ensured public and environmental safety from the building’s radiological and chemical hazards. Sophisticated ventilation systems kept radiological contamination inside glove boxes or hoods. Around-the-clock surveillances monitored the integrity of safety systems as a shift office kept tabs all the time.

   “The preparations leading up to PFP demolition require a constant focus on safety performance. This obsession for safety drives PFP personnel to continuously evaluate each and every work activity to ensure compliance with requirements, procedures, and the necessary controls to protect the workers, the public, and the environment,” said Al Colburn, nuclear safety staffer with EM’s Richland Operations Office. 

   As workers remove hazards within PFP and prepare the building for demolition, corresponding safety controls are reduced. Jeff King ensures the new safety controls correspond to the risks. He began working at PFP in 1982 as a radiological control technician and is now a nuclear operations and licensing specialist. During his tenure, King has watched the building transition from production mode to demolition mode. 

   “The amount of work the crews have done to take these systems out — the process piping, the glove boxes — is amazing,” he said.

   As each contaminated component is removed, a corresponding amount of residual nuclear material, called “material at risk” (MAR), is also removed, which means the risk to the public, environment, and workers decreases. 

   King was there when the PFP team successfully developed a tiered approach to reduce controls while preparing to demolish the facility’s plutonium storage vaults in 2012. He also supported the team that developed a similar approach to demolition of the PFP’s main facilities.

   What resulted, after a lot of team work, was Documented Safety Analysis, Revision 12, which was implemented in January 2016. Revision 12 contains revised accident analyses that reflect the MAR reduction at PFP that has occurred since 2004.

   King describes Revision 12 as a simpler controlled approach, tailored to remaining risk levels for fire and ventilation systems, giving PFP operations and maintenance crews more flexibility in how they maintain building systems. The project is now implementing Revision 13, which further refines controls based on updated demolition plans. 

   As risks continue to decrease, the plant transitions into pre-demolition and then demolition phases, and King will be there, too.